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On the verge of the twenty-first century, America finds itself in the position of a 
great power with dominant military technology. This thesis examines the possibility that 
weaker states may be able to strategically innovate and defeat us in war despite our 
technological advantages. The purpose of the thesis is to survey what type of strategic 
innovations, also known as asymmetric strategies, are possible and to examine the 
conditions under which they may be successful. 
This thesis begins by defining asymmetric strategies using a comprehensive model 
of strategy developed by Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie. The thesis also examines four variables 
which may explain the success or failure of asymmetric strategies. To illustrate possible 
asymmetric strategies and examine the contextual conditions under which they work, the 
thesis considers the cases of the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935-36, the Russo-Finnish War of 
1939-40, and the American-North Vietnamese War of 1965-73. The thesis finds that the 
four variables have significant explanatory power for the success or failure of these 
strategies. The thesis concludes by examining strategic implications for the United States, 
both as a possible opponent of weak states and as a supporter of a weak state faced by a 
great power threat. 
v 
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America will enter the next century with an unmatched technological advantage. 
But will this ensure victory in all military confrontations? Recently, military leaders have 
argued that we may face "asymmetric threats" in the future. 1 Other military writers have 
penned fictional accounts of enemies using possible asymmetric strategies to defeat the 
United States.2 The general argument that links them all is that, despite America's 
technological advantages, our enemies could adopt innovative asymmetric tactics or 
strategies to negate our strengths. Despite this concern about possible strategic innovation 
in war, the concept remains largely undefined. The purpose of this thesis is to define 
asymmetric military strategy and to examine the conditions under which it might be 
successful. 
The concept of asymmetry has recently been applied in a number of different 
contexts. First, a non-traditional, non-military adversary (or network of adversaries) such 
as terrorists, narco-trafficers, or transnational criminals can be considered an asymmetric 
threat.3 Second, conflicts may involve asymmetric stakes; in other words, one side may 
1 For example, see General Charles Krolak, Commandant, USMC, "A Matter of Strategic Focus," 
Airpower Journal (Spring 1997): 62. An overview of possible tactical responses to U.S. technological 
dominance is found in Capt. James Stavridis, USN, "The Second Revolution," Joint Force Quarterly, no.15 
(Spring 1997): 8-13. 
·
2 Examples include Col. Charles Dunlap, USAF, "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007," 
The Weekly Standard, 29 Jan 1996; various books and articles by Maj. Ralph Peters, USA, such as the War 
in 2020 (New York: Pocket Books, 1991) and "The Perspective from 2021," Strategic Review 25, no. 2 
(Spring 1997): 51-59; and the author's own "General Tzu's Army: OPFOR for the Future," Joint Force 
Quarterly, no.15 (Spring 1997): 44-49. Future wars with lesser asymmetric characteristics appear in a 
books by Col. Trevor Dupuy, USA (ret.), Future Wars (New York: Warner Books, 1993); and former 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger with Peter Schweizer, The Next War (Washington: Regnery, 
1996). Popular fiction writers like Tom Clancy have also created readable, if not always plausible, future 
scenarios. 
3 Referred to as asymmetric in Col. James M. Dubik, USA, "The New Logic," Armed Forces 
Journal International, January 1997, 43. For an overview on these type of threats see Hans Binnendijk and 
Patrick Clawson, eds. Strategic Assessment 1997 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1997), 241. 
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have more to lose than the other.4 This is a usual feature of great power-weak state 
conflicts where national survival is a concern for only one side. Third, asymmetry may 
exist between the weapons technology used by two opponents.5 Fourth, a single nation-
state or groups of states may attempt to mix conventional and unconventional approaches to 
craft an asymmetric strategy to defeat us in war.6 This final use of asymmetry will be the 
focus of this thesis, although the three other uses of the word will be considered in their 
relationship to the fourth. 
In considering the topic of asymmetric strategies in war, I will approach the topic 
from the perspective of a military strategist. By that I mean to consider the questions of 
"What is an asymmetric strategy?", "What is required to make it work?" and "How much 
of a danger does it pose?" These questions present a different focus from that of the 
political scientist who primarily, but not exclusively, considers "Which states are most 
likely to use asymmetric strategies and why?" The military strategist should also be 
interested in these questions; luckily, they have already been well addressed in academic 
circles.7 
4 One example of this usage of asymmetry is David Ochmanek, "Time to Restructure U.S. 
Defense Forces," Issues in Science and Technology, Winter 1996-97, 36. 
5 Robert O'Connell first used the term weapons asymmetry in his book Of Anns and Men (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989),7-8. O'Connell saw that nations and militaries could choose a 
symmetrical or an asymmetrical response to an opponent's armaments. A symmetrical response would be 
the development or acquisition of a system similar to the opponents( e.g. a Corsair fighter versus a Zero). 
An counter response would be the use of a dissimilar system, therefore resulting in an asymmetric 
situation( e.g. SAMs versus bombers). 
6 Maj. Gen. Robert Scales, USA, sketched out such an asymmetric approach in an interview with 
the Army News Service. He sees the possibility of "A major competitor ... a state or group of states who, 
in the future, might seek to come at us asymmetrically' to limit our advantage in technology by buying 
cheap precision and counter-precision [weaponry] of his own, and then to apply his own strengths. His 
strengths are: [an] ability to build an efficient mass army, to build consensus [through] the collective 
popular will...and his ability to capitalize on the inherent power of the defensive." See Army Link News at 
the Army's web site, "Avoiding attrition warfare in 2020-2025," 28 July 1997. 
7 Among the sources which cover this topic are: John Arquilla, Dubious Battles (Washington, 
D.C.: Crane Russak, 1992); Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981); esp. 59-66; and Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System 
(London: Frank Cass, 1981), esp. 76-104. 
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In this inquiry, I make two major assumptions about the conditions under which the 
U.S. will fight for the next decade, and possibly longer. First, such wars will be great 
power-small power conflicts. Most defense analysts agree that there is now a "strategic 
lull," a period where the U.S. lacks a peer competitor.8 Furthermore, most estimates give 
the U.S. at least ten years before a peer competitor arrives.9 
Second, the U.S. will go into conflict with an asymmetric technological capability. 
As Richard Betts and others have noted, "It appears that for at least quite some time no 
other country will be able to catch up to the United States in this process of adapting 
technology, force structure, and doctrine. Therefore, no other country is likely to be able 
to match American combat power pound for pound."10 Because of the inability of our 
future opponents to duplicate America's space and computer-based military advantage, the 
period of the next one-to-two decades, and possibly longer, will be one of weapons 
asymmetry. 
But will this technological advantage ensure victory in war? Military analysts, both 
in government and academia, are now arguing that America's technological advantage will 
ensure our military dominance in the future. JosephS. Nye, Jr. and Admiral William A. 
Owens claim that in the "foreseeable future" America will be "more powerful than any 
other. "11 George and Meredith Friedman extend our dominance further, claiming "the 
twenty-first century will be the American century."12 
8 Strategic Assessment 1997, 241-242. See also, Russell Travers, "A New Millennium and 
Strategic Breathing Space," Washington Quarterly 20, no.2 (Spring 1997): 107. 
9 The American intelligence community has concluded that no conventional military peer could 
appear before 2010. As reported in "Who's the Enemy?," U.S. News and World Report, 12 May 1997, 34. 
10 Richard K. Betts, "Power, Prospects, and Priorities," Na\)al War College Review 50, no.1 
(Winter 1997): 20. 
11 Joseph Nye and William Owens, "America's Information Edge," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 
(March/ April1996), 20. 
12 George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War (New York: Crown, 1996), 1. 
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Such technological optimism is not new. Prior to today's information-driven 
Revolution in Military Affairs, advocates of air power and nuclear weapons predicted great 
changes in warfare with American dominance as a result.13 John Arquilla in his book, 
Dubious Battles: Aggression, Defeat, and the International System, identifies similar 
strands of thought in earlier military thinkers, historians, and political philosophers. 14 But 
history has largely proven these techno-optimists wrong. 
The technologically superior side has not always won battles and wars. A 
technologically primitive Zulu force annihilated a rifle-armed British force at Isandhlwana. 
A force of mountain men in Mghanistan defeated the mechanized and air-dominant armed 
forces of the Soviet Union. Subjecting history to quantitative analysis, John Arquilla finds 
that the theory of victory through technology provides a very poor explanation of actual 
results in war. 15 
Instead of placing all our faith in our technological superiority, we should consider 
the possible responses our opponents could make given the context of the conflict. As 
Michael Handel has observed, "In the age of advanced technology, there is a natural 
proclivity to overestimate the role of weapons in war and, as a result, to undervalue the 
non-tangible dimensions of strategy and war."16 But there is much to gain by moving 
beyond the technological tangibles into the world of strategy. By considering possible 
enemy strategies, we increase our knowledge and begin to approach the ideal of Sun Tzu: 
13 On air power, see David Maclssac, "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists," in 
Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. by Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 624-647. 
For a more recent perspective on air power, see Richard Hallion, Storm over Iraq (Washington D.C.: 
Smithsonian, 1992), esp. 264. On nuclear weapons, see Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations 
of Nuclear Strategists," also in Makers of Modern Strategy, 738-741. 
14 Arquilla, 85. See also Alex Roland, "Technology and War: The Historiographical Revolution of 
the 1980s," Technology and Culture 34, no.1 (January 1993): 117-134. 
15 Arquilla, 86. 
16 Michael Handel, Masters of War (London: Frank Cass, 1992), 19. 
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knowing both ourselves and the enemy.17 Armed with this knowledge, we can better 
estimate the danger of enemy actions and preempt their strategies, the "highest realization of 
warfare" in the words of the ancient Chinese strategist.18 
17 Sun Tzu and Sun Pin, The Complete Art of War, trans. by Ralph Sawyer (Boulder: Westview, 
1996), 52. 
18 Ibid., 50. 
5 
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II. A MODEL OF STRATEGY 
A. DEFINITIONS AND THE MODEL 
Everyone who writes on the subject of strategy finds it necessary 
to define his understanding of the meaning of the word. As a result there 
are as many definitions as there are writers. Admiral Castex, for example, 
quotes nineteen different definitions and then makes up one of his own. 
Colonel Ned B. Rehkopf, United States Army, 19391 
The logical starting point for defining asymmetric strategy is the definition of 
strategy itself. After achieving that, we will progress to a definition of military strategy. 
Only after laying this foundation can we fmd a solid definition of asymmetric strategy. 
Strategy as a general concept is applied to more than national security, the military, 
and war. We talk of"strategic investors" and "strategies to achieve happiness in life."2 In 
its general form, a Navy strategist, Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, defined strategy as "a plan of 
action designed in order to achieve some end; a purpose together with a system of measures 
for its accomplishment."3 General Maxwell D. Taylor and Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr. 
provided a comparable general defmition of strategy: strategy is the combination of ways 
(courses of action) to use means (resources) to achieve ends (objectives).4 This general 
definition of strategy will be used throughout this thesis. 
Strategy in the military sense occurs at four levels.5 Grand strategy is about the 
question of which wars to enter or initiate, and how to manipulate all the sources of 
1 As cited in Russell Weigley, The American Way of War (New York: Macmillan, 1973), xv. 
2 One prominent example of the other-than-military use of strategy is A vinash Dixit and Barry 
Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1991). 
3 Military Strategy, Classics of Sea Power, eds. John Hattendorf and Wayne Hughes (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1967, reprinted with a new introduction and postscript, 1989), 14. 
4 Arthur F. Lykke, "Defining Military Strategy," Military Review 69, no.5 (May 1989): 3. 
5 Since Clausewitz' s time, the complexity of armed conflict has expanded the conception of 
strategy from the old distinction between strategy and tactics into a four-level system. See David 
Jablonsky, Why is Strategy Difficult?, Professional Readings in Military Strategy, No.4 (U.S. Army War 
College: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992). This is the most common modern conceptualization of 
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national power in peace and war to one's own advantage.6 At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, tactics, a form of strategy in the general sense, is about how to win battles. 7 
Above tactics, but below military strategy, is a more recent construct known as "operational 
art." The focus of this thesis will be at the third level from the bottom, military strategy, 
the combination of ways, means, and ends, specifically in the context ofwar(see Figure 1). 
Grand Strategy 
Military Strategy 
(as applied in war-
the focus of this thesis) 
Operational Art 
Tactics 
Figure 1. The Levels of Strategy 
The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff define military strategy as "the art and science of 
employing armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the 
application of force or the threat of force."8 By this definition, it is clear that military 
strategy can be applied during peacetime, although strategies for doing so are outside the 
realm of this thesis. In the context of war, military strategy can be viewed narrowly as 
strategy, although Edward Luttwak adds a fifth layer, the technical level. See Edward Luttwak, Strategy 
(Cambridge: Belknap Harvard, 1987), chap. 5, 73-81. 
6 For a more complete definition and discussion of grand strategy, see B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 
second revised edition (New York: Meridian, 1967), 322, and Paul Kennedy, Grand Strategy in War and 
Peace (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 4. 
7 For more see Liddell Hart, 321, and Edward Luttwak, (fn. 5), chap. 6, 82-90. 
8 Lykke, 3. 
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encompassing only the actions of anned forces against a similar opponent or as a broader 
concept, where military forces play a lead role but are also supported by political, 
diplomatic, economic, and other actions. One example of a narrow conception is a 
definition by the historian Archer Jones; "The objective for military strategy .. .is the 
depletion of the military force of an adversary. "9 Two other historians, Williamson Murray 
and Mark Grimsley critique B.H. Liddell Hart's narrow definition of military strategy (and 
by extension, Jones' approach); "this forthright but unhappy example restricts the word 
strictly to military affairs, whereas in practice strategy operates in a much broader 
sphere. "1 0 This author will use a broader definition of military strategy, which includes the 
integration of non-military concerns, such as diplomacy, which are usually considered 
separate and outside the context of war. 11 When discussing military strategy in war, 
separation of politics and other concerns into distinct realms is a false division. In war, 
military action is the central activity but not an independent entity. It is directly linked to 
non-military concerns, and military strategy must be considered in conjunction with these 
issues. 
There have been a number of theoretical military strategies put forward on how to 
achieve victory in war. Some of the more famous theories for what makes a successful 
military strategy focus only on the "means" or the "ways" part of the strategic equation. 
Examples of means-based strategic theories include those of Alfred Thayer Mahan, who 
9 Archer Jones, Elements of Military Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), xiii. By using such 
a narrow definition, Jones is forced to add another term, political-military strategy. This author considers 
his narrow usage to be the same as or close to the definition of operational strategy. 
10 Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, "Introduction: On Strategy," in The Making of 
Strategy, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 1. 
11 Some may argue that this is the province of grand strategy. This author's conception, however, 
is that war is merely one tool of grand strategy( which in turn should then focus on when it is used), while 
war is the main focus of military strategy(which defines its conduct). Making war's conduct the focus of 
grand strategy risks losing its wider perspective over all matters of war and peace. The consideration of the 
employment of military forces in isolation from other factors falls into the realm of operational art. 
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preached that sea power was the key to a nation's strength, and Guilio Doubet, who 
thought that air power would become the sole decisive factor in war. A prominent example 
of a ways-based strategic theory is B.H. Liddell Hart who claimed his "indirect approach" 
was the historically proven method to achieve victory. Many western commentators, when 
first exposed to guerrilla warfare following W.W. II, claimed that the way of revolutionary 
warfare was a decisive new form of strategy.12 Yet none of these theories have proven 
one-hundred percent effective in bringing victory under all conditions. 
There has been, however, at least one attempt made at a "unified" theory of strategy 
which accepts a variety of means and ways in war without claiming the superiority of any 
one. In 1967, Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie developed his theory of military strategy. Wylie 
simplified the bottom line for the military strategist: 
The primary aim .. .in the conduct of war is some selected degree 
of control of the enemy for the strategist's own purpose; this is achieved 
by control of the pattern of war; and this control of the pattern of war is 
had by manipulation of the center of gravity of war to the advantage of 
the strategist and the disadvantage of the opponent. 13 
In Wylie's theory of military strategy, the two key components are therefore the choice of 
an operational pattern and the identification of the enemy's center of gravity. 
Wylie identified two separate operational patterns in war, the cumulative and the 
sequential. 14 A sequential pattern of war is a series of discrete steps which build upon each 
other. The sequence of actions leads to victory; loss of any one step could have critical 
repercussions on the strategy. On the other hand, in a cumulative pattern, the strategy is 
based upon "a collection of lesser actions," none of which is dependent on another. 
Wylie's distinction between sequential and cumulative operational patterns is quite similar 
12 For one example, see Roger Trinquier, Modem Warfare, trans. by Daniel Lee (New York: 
Praeger, 1961). 
13 Wylie, 77-78. 
14 Ibid., Chapter 3, 22-27. 
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to the "double form of strategy" seen by an nineteenth and early twentieth century military 
historian, Hans Delbruck. 
Delbruck divided strategic patterns into those that seek to annihilate and those that 
seek to exhaust the enemy. 15 Delbruck defined an annihilation strategy as following the 
first natural principle of strategy which was: 
to assemble one's forces, seek out the main force of the enemy, defeat it, 
and follow up the victory until the defeated side subjects itself to the will 
of the victor and accepts his conditions, which means in the most extreme 
case up to occupation of the entire enemy country.16 
This annihilation strategy follows a clear sequence which puts its emphasis on destroying 
the other's forces in battle. And as Delbruck observed, it "presupposes a sufficient 
superiority." 
The exhaustion strategy, on the other hand, does not seek victory through a series 
of decisive battles. To Delbruck, a strategist who sought to exhaust his enemy did: 
not so much place his hopes on completely defeating the enemy 
as on wearing him out and exhausting him by blows and destruction of 
all kinds to the extent that in the end he prefers to accept the conditions 
of the victor, which in this case must always show a certain moderation. 17 
This was the strategy of weaker armies and those who would or could not risk all on a 
single decisive battle. 
The second component of a military strategy is the center of gravity. Wylie 
described the center of gravity as a "national jugular vein," that is ideally both critical to the 
enemy and vulnerable to your strategy.18 Both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz recognized the 
15 Hans Delbruck, The Dawn of Modem Warfare, History of the Art of War, Vol. IV, trans. by 
Walter Renfroe (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 293-295. In this edition, the translator 
uses "attrition" instead of"exhaustion." Russell Weigley's work repeats the same usage. This is 
confusing, because Delbruck's usage is not the same as the modern operational usage( e.g. maneuver vs. 
attrition). I will refer to Delbruck's two forms of strategy as annihilation and exhaustion, as used by 
Gordon Craig, "Delbruck: The Military Historian," Makers of Modem Strategy, 341. 
16 Delbruck, 293. 
17 Ibid., 294. 
18 Wylie, 77. 
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concept of the center of gravity, although their treatment of the topic was different. 19 But it 
is clear that both recognized the center of gravity as more than merely military forces or a 
geographic location. The enemy's center of gravity can be any necessary factor for the 
execution of his strategy. In this sense, a center of gravity may be thought of as being the 
military force, its logistic support, the social cohesion of the nation, or the political alliances 
to sustain the effort. 20 
Center of gravity is usually defined in relation to the target of the strategy; 
theoretically, it is the opponent's one "hub of all power and movement, on which 
everything depends."21 While such an approach has use as a planning tool when 
attempting to attack an opponent, it has less value in describing and understanding a state's 
strategic course of action. A state will not always correctly identify the opponent's center 
of gravity, nor will it always fmds the means to attack it. Identifying the one supposed 
center of gravity after the fact is often a difficult and highly subjective process. 
As used in this thesis, center of gravity will therefore be defined relative to the state 
implementing the strategy. In this sense, the center of gravity is the primary "defeat 
mechanism" by which the state seeks to gain victory. The defeat mechanism can be a 
tangible, physical goal, such as the destruction of the enemy's forces or the capture of his 
19 Handel, Masters of War, chap.5. 
20 This is not only a modern construction. As Handel observes, "Sun Tzu ... views the political, 
diplomatic and logistical preparations for war as well as the fighting as integral parts of the same 
activity."(Masters of War, 37) Clausewitz narrowed his main effort of On War to focus on what we now 
call the operational level of war.(Masters of War, 48) More recent observers have argued that we once again 
need to expand our conception of strategy. See Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," 
in The Causes of War, second edition, (Cambridge: Harvard, 1983). 
21 Clausewitz as cited in Steven Metz and Frederick Downey, "Centers of Gravity and Strategic 
Planning," Military Review 68, no. 4 (April 1988): 24. For a summary of the modern conception of the 
center of gravity in relation to the enemy, see Jeffrey Harley, "Information, Technology, and the Center of 
Gravity," Naval War College Review 50, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 78-9. 
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capital, or a more abstract one, such as the breaking of the opponent's national will to 
persist in the war. 22 
Given this definition, which lays out the operational pattern and center of gravity as 
the key determinants of a military strategy, we can finally see what comprises an 
asymmetric strategy. Based on Wylie's model of strategy, a state has the choice of 
following a cumulative or a sequential operational pattern. Furthermore, it can direct this 
operational pattern at a tangible or an abstract center of gravity. An enemy's response can 
defined as asymmetric if: 1) its operational pattern is different from your own; and/or 2) if it 
is seeking to attack a different type of center of gravity than the one you have chosen. As 
shown in the strategic options matrix (Figure 2), a strategy is asymmetric if it occupies any 
quadrant separate from the enemy's approach. Furthermore, strategies which are 
horizontally or vertically opposed are partially asymmetric, while strategies in diagonal 













(when facing a 
weaker opponent) 
Figure 2. Strategic Options Matrix 
22 Metz and Downey, 26, make the distinction between tangible and psychological centers of 
gravity. 
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Great powers, when confronted with a weaker opponent, usually choose strategies 
which occupy the lower-left quadrant. As Delbruck observed, they feel their material and 
technological preponderance should allow them rapid success on the battlefield. Russell 
Weigley examined the experience of the United States and found an American preference 
for strategies of the lower-left quadrant. In Weigley's words, "the wealth of the country 
and its adoption of unlimited aims in war cut that development [of alternate approaches] 
short, until the strategy of annihilation [of enemy forces] became characteristically the 
American way of war.'m 
A final definition we should consider is that of victory (and its opposite, defeat). 
Victory, in relation to the most general definition of strategy, is the accomplishment of the 
goals set forth by the state at the beginning of war. States, however, do not always achieve 
their goals or stick to them. If a state is compelled to change or reduce its war aims, this 
could be considered a partial victory or minor defeat. Making a determination as to which 
side of the line the outcome lies on can be done by relating it to the state's initial war aims; 
a small change might still yield some aspects of victory, while a large deviation is probably 
a defeat. 
B. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
Admiral Wylie's model alone does not predict success or failure of a given strategy. 
It serves merely as a tool to help define asymmetric strategy and illuminate possible 
strategic options. A single model is unlikely to do more than this because, as Murray and 
Grimsley observe, "while models and categories may assist analysis, they can offer no 
formulas for the successful framing of strategy or conduct of war. Theories all too often 
23 Weigley, xxii. 
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aim at fixed values, but in war and strategy most things are uncertain and variable. "24 
Therefore, to answer the question of "when may asymmetric strategies used by weak states 
against great powers be effective?" we must look beyond Wylie's model. As mentioned 
before, no single "strategy" has proven effective in all circumstances. Victory appears to 
be the result of finding the right strategy for the given circumstances. If we accept that the 
inter-state wars in America's future will be of the great power-weak state type and involve 
asymmetric technological capabilities, we should consider "what additional conditions 
could lead to success for the weak state's strategy?" By framing the question as narrowly 
as possible, we should be able to minimize the uncertainties and variables which would 
affect our analysis of strategy if considered in a wider context. 
A number of explanations for the success of asymmetric strategies have been put 
forward. These explanations will be treated as independent variables which, when 
combined with asymmetric strategies under the conditions mentioned before, produce the 
dependent variable, victory. These hypotheses of what is required to make an asymmetric 
strategy successful are 1) the need for a skilled army; 2) the importance of having a 
superior (asymmetric) national will relative to your enemy; and 3) reliance on external 
support. 
The first hypothesis is that to make any strategy work and achieve victory, a skilled 
army is required. Using a statistical analysis of conflicts, John Arquilla found that the skill 
of the army makes the difference in wars on land. 25 China's most prominent political 
figure and strategist of the modern age, Mao Tse-tung, reached the same conclusion. Shu 
Guang Zhang summarizes Mao's thinking: "In his view, if one side's subjective ability in 
directing war was superior to the other's, its inferior military capability could turn into a 
24 Murray and Grimsley, 1. 
25 John Arquilla, Dubious Battles (Washington, D.C.: Crane Russak, 1992), 83. 
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superior one."26 More recently, Stephen Biddle of the Institute for Defense Analysis has 
found that technology alone does not decide battle outcomes; instead, it must be considered 
hand-in-hand with the skill differentials between the fighting forces. 27 He concludes that 
"If one's own skills are high, one is insulated to an important degree against variations in 
opposing technology, even if one's own weapons change only incrementally."28 
The problem, then, is in detennining what makes a skilled army. Arquilla and 
others use a battle death ratio between sides to determine skill. Such a measure has a major 
flaw: a technologically inferior army may deliberately suffer higher casualties in order to 
compensate for its material deficiencies. In Afghanistan, the rebels suffered between 1.5 
and 2.4 casualties for every Soviet or government soldier killed or wounded. 29 Yet most 
would acknowledge that the rebels fought with greater skill, especially in the face of the 
technological superiority of their opponents. 
Because of the limitations of quantitative data in conflicts with asymmetric 
technology, we should judge a skilled army by qualitative measures. Specifically, how 
does the skill of the weaker state's army compare to the opponent's? Has the army of the 
weaker state been able to adapt to the disadvantaged circumstances under which it is 
fighting? Has it been able to develop effective responses to counter the opponent's 
technology? And is the army still able to conduct operations which support the leadership's 
strategy for victory? 
A second possible requirement to implement an asymmetric strategy may be a 
superior political will to bear heavy casualties and continue the fight under extremely 
discouraging circumstances. Clausewitz recognized that victory in war required more than 
26 Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 
20. 
27 Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood," International Security 21, No.2 (Fall 1996), 139-
179. 
28 Ibid., 177. 
29 Data from Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, The Lessons of Modem War, Volume Ill 
(Boulder: Westview, 1990), 10. 
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the physical acts of destroying an enemy's anny and occupying his land; it also was 
necessary to break the enemy's will to fight.30 More recently, Andrew Mack put forward a 
"pre-theoretical perspective" on conflicts between nations with asymmetric "wills."31 Mack 
recognized that the disparity in interests between the weaker and the greater power could 
result in a disparity between the two sides' endurance and willingness to continue fighting. 
Faced with a weaker state's strategy of exhaustion, the great power, who is not fighting for 
national survival, suffers internal and external political constraints which could lead to its 
defeat( or at least withdrawal from the conflict). Mack concludes that these considerations 
mean that "the military struggle on the ground must be evaluated not in terms of the narrow 
calculus of military tactics, but in terms of its political impact in the [great power]."32 Most 
recently, Stephen Peter Rosen put forward hypotheses that "the social structures of the 
political unit can affect its ability to generate military power.'m Rosen also sees that 
society's problems can possibly spillover into the military organization itself. 
We can judge the relative differential of national will between the two sides by 
asking the following questions: Did either side face internal dissent to the war? If there was 
internal dissent, did it affect the national leadership in their choices about the conduct and 
continuation of the war? Did either side restrain its operations due to any internal political 
considerations? And did internal dissent have a resulting effect on the nation's military 
forces? 
The final possible requirement for a successful asymmetric strategy is external 
support. Michael Handel has found that: 
30 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 90. 
31 Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars," World Politics 27, no.1 (Oct 1974), 175-
200. 
32 Ibid., 179. 
33 Stephen Peter Rosen, Societies and Military Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 30. 
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One of the major differences between the weak states and the 
great powers is that the weak states rely much more heavily on external 
strength when they are fighting against other weak states supported by 
a great power, or directly against a great power.34 
We can subdivide external support into four types. The first is moral or diplomatic 
support; usually this takes the form of public speeches or demonstrations by an external 
power. The second is material or volunteer support. This includes weapons, ammunition, 
supplies and individuals or small units in support or combat roles. The last two types of 
support involve external direct intervention. Intervention is more than the introduction of 
"volunteers" to fight under the control and the flag of the weak state; it is the commitment 
of the combat units of an external power to fight under their own flag and take a direct role 
in operations against the great power. Intervention may be threatened (one form of 
support) or actually implemented (the last type of support). This thesis will not consider 
cases with the last form of support because external intervention changes the dynamics of 
the conflict and may eliminate the need to follow an asymmetric strategy. 
In evaluating these variables on asymmetric strategies, we face three methodological 
problems. First, the sample size is relatively small. Second, war and strategy are about the 
interaction of at least two players and not just one. Third, strategy, in the recent words of 
one theorist, has dynamic inter-dimensional characteristics.35 With the proper 
consideration, however, none of these concerns is overwhelming. 
Because relevant cases for this study must meet three requirements, the sample size 
is limited. First, the conflict must be a great power-weak state war. Second, the great 
power must have asymmetric technological capabilities. Third, the weak state must have 
attempted an asymmetric strategy. Of these, the last is the most limiting. Although there 
have been a large number of great power-weak state wars between armies with asymmetric 
weapons since the time of Cortez's conquest of the Aztecs, they have generally resulted in 
34 Handel, Weak States in the International System, 103. 
35 See Antulio Echevarria, "Dynamic Inter-Dimensionality," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 15 (Spring 
1997), 29-36. 
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the defeat of the technologically weaker side due to a reliance on symmetric strategies. 36 
Zulus, Burmans, Indians, Dervishes, and others proved willing to charge directly into the 
face of British firepower and that of the other colonial powers.37 
More recently, strategies for resisting great powers have either become non-existent 
or more sophisticated. America's most recent interventions throughout Latin America have 
generally been conducted in the face of weak strategies. Grenada, Panama, and Haiti are 
examples of U.S. intervention against opponents with little or no strategy to respond. But 
there are still some cases which meet our requirements. Among these are the ltalo-
Ethiopian War of 1935, the Russo-Finnish War of 1939, and the American's involvement 
in Vietnam, 1965-1973.38 The limited sample size prevents a statistical or quantitatively 
based analysis of asymmetric strategy under the conditions we have set, but still allows for 
a case study approach. The limited number of cases also serves as a reminder that weak 
states will not always make the most rational choice or be able to implement an asymmetric 
strategy. 
Second, in mathematical terms, strategy is a two-player interactive game where the 
qualities and actions of both sides together determine the outcome of the event. To take this 
into account, we must examine relative, and not absolute, values when considering the skill 
of weaker side's army. The two-player nature of war also yields a fourth possible 
hypothesis for the success or failure of an asymmetric strategy: victory is only possible if 
the great power fails to take action to counter the asymmetric strategy. We should examine 
36 Trevor Dupuy, Understanding Defeat, second edition (McLean, Va.: NOVA, 1990), 60-61. 
37 Mao Tse-tung came to this conclusion. In an essay on Mao, E. L. Katzenbach writes "By and 
large, it would seem true that what made the machinery of European troops so successful was that native 
troops saw fit to die, with glory, with honor, en masse, and in vain." See E. L. Katzenbach, "Time, Space, 
and Will: The Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-tung," in The Guerrilla- and How to Fight Him, ed. by 
T.N. Greene (New York: Praeger, 1962), 14-15. 
38 I also considered the 1979-1988 war between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan as a possible 
case. On the spectrum of conflict, the war was more an intra-state insurgency with external intervention as 
opposed to a great power-weak power interstate war. Also, although Soviet operations are relatively well 
covered, data on Afghani strategy and operations is considerably more difficult to come by. 
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this by looking at whether the great power recognized the opponent's asymmetric strategy 
and took action to disrupt or undermine it or any of the other hypothesized critical factors 
(skill, national will, and external support). 
Third, as one military theorist has recently observed, strategy is a dynamic inter-
dimensional problem covering many areas that are usually considered separately in 
scholarly works. By using a broad definition of military strategy and recognizing that the 
center of gravity may be more than military forces or geography, we have also grappled 
with part of this problem. We must also consider that "the multiple dimensions of interact 
dynamically."39 We can take this into account by not only looking for relationships 
between the independent variables and the dependent variable, but also by considering the 
interaction between the independent variables themselves. 
The following chapters will individually cover the Italo-Ethiopian, Russo-Finnish, 
and American-North Vietnamese Wars. Each chapter will begin by examining the nature of 
the great power's asymmetric technology and the weak state's asymmetric strategy. Next, 
the operational course of the war will be reviewed. Finally, each of the four hypotheses 
will be considered in relation to the outcome of the war. After covering the three cases, the 
concluding chapter will evaluate the asymmetric strategy and the hypotheses in light of 
current and projected trends. 
39 Echevarria, 35. 
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III . THE ITALO-ETHIOPIAN WAR(1935-1936) 
A. THE CONFLICT 
1. Background 
The 1935 war was not the first conflict between Italy and Ethiopia. Italy had been 
interested in Ethiopia, Eritrea to the north, and Somaliland to the east since 1857. Modem 
Ethiopia began its transformation from a feudal society to a centralized state in 1855.1 In 
January 1887, Yohannes, one of the Ethiopian feudal leaders attempting to unify the 
country, defeated an Italian force at Dogali. In response, the Italians reinforced their troops 
and concluded an alliance with Yohannes' rival, Menelik II. In doing so, the Italians 
occupied Eritrea, north of Ethiopia, as a colony and established a fraudulent protectorate 
over the remainder of Ethiopia. Menelik resisted Italy's plans for expansion and, by 1894, 
both sides were preparing for war. On March 1, 1896, Menelik's army decimated an 
Italian force at Adowa, winning "the greatest victory black Mricans ever achieved over a 
European foe."2 Italy was forced to recognize Ethiopian independence, although a clear 
border was never demarcated between Eritrea, still under Italian control, and its neighbor to 
the south. This would remain a constant source of tension over the years. 
In spite of the battlefield defeat at Adowa, Italy never relinquished its plans for a 
larger empire. The Italian leadership hoped to include Ethiopia into their empire after 
Menelik' s death. Following World War I, they were unable to realize their goals at the 
Paris Peace Conference. The Italians were also unable to take advantage of internal 
1 Historical background primarily comes from Richard Greenfield, Ethiopia (New York: Praeger, 
1965), and Brian Sullivan, "The Italo-Ethiopian War," in Great Powers and Little Wars, ed. by A. Hamish 
Ion and E.J. Errington (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 169-175. 
2 There is not a single consistent system for translating Ethiopian to English. For instance, 
Adowa is also translated as Adua, Adwa, or Aduwa. This thesis will use the most common usage from 
among the sources consulted. Quote from Sullivan, 172. 
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Ethiopian strife for the succession of the Emperor's throne. Haile Selassie took the throne 
in 1930, unifying Ethiopia to an extent unseen since Menelik's death in 1913. 
With the rise of fascism and the government of Benito Mussolini in 1922, Italian 
imperialism took on a more aggressive character. Despite overt diplomatic moves towards 
peace, Mussolini was planning for a military conquest of Ethiopia as early as 1925.3 In 
1934, with the desired conditions established, Italy used the W al-W al border skirmish 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea to justify a mobilization which would lead to war in the 
following year.4 
2. Asymmetric Weapons and Technology 
In everything except overall numbers, the Ethiopians were far worse 
equipped than the fascists and their colonial troops.5 
The overinflated Italian estimate of Ethiopian forces at the beginning of the war was 
350,000 rifle-armed men, 200 pieces of artillery, fifty anti-aircraft guns, and a few armored 
cars.6 The first Italian force moved to Africa had more than 200,000 men, 6000 machine 
guns, 700 cannon, 150 tanks, and 150 combat aircraft.7 This force was significantly 
reinforced both before and during the war. The Italians also supplemented their manpower 
with colonial forces. 8 This numerical balance, however, belies the significant technological 
asymmetries between the two combatants. 
3 Diplomatic gestures by Italy included supporting Ethiopia's entry into the League of Nations in 
1923 and the Treaty of Friendship in 1928. As will be shown later, these moves masked Italy's aggressive 
intentions. On entry into the League, see George Baer, The Coming of the Jtalian-Ethiopian War 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 10-14. On the treaty, see Baer, 19-20. On Mussolini's 
planning, see Angelo Del Boca, The Ethiopian War, trans. P.D. Cummins (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1969), 8-16. 
4 On Wal-Wal, see Baer, chap. 3, 45-61; and Del Boca, 19-20. 
5 Greenfield, 194. 
6 Del Boca, 37. 
7 Ibid., 22. 
8 A large number of colonial troops served with the Italian army during the war. They included 
Askaris from Eritrea, Dubats from Somaliland, and Libyans. Various ethnic groups opposed to Selassie's 
22 
On land, Ethiopian forces were at least a generation behind the Italians in terms of 
equipment. Ethiopia had only enough modern rifles to outfit about 75,000 men; most of 
their other small arms dated from the late-nineteenth century. Some even went into battle 
with spears, swords, or clubs. The few hundred machine guns of Haile Selassie' s army 
made them specialty weapons; in Mussolini's army, they were numerous enough to be a 
regular arm of every company. Ethiopian artillery was obsolete; their guns were built on 
the rigid gun carriages of the previous century. Because of their old design, Ethiopian 
cannon were unable to deliver accurate indirect fires. Italy, on the other hand, possessed 
modern cannon which allowed massed bombardments from outside line-of-sight to the 
target. Of the primary ground combat weapons of the time (rifles, machine guns, tanks, 
and artillery), Italy had a decisive qualitative edge in all four types.9 
The balance in the air was even more skewed. Although Ethiopia had ten or fifteen 
aircraft, they were biplanes, obsolete for all but reconnaissance, medical evacuation, or 
light transport purposes.1° For air defense, there were only thirteen antiaircraft guns in the 
entire country. And besides the Emperor, few if any Ethiopians understood the 
implications of modern air power. Italy, on the other hand, relative to the Ethiopians had a 
robust air force of bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance aircraft. 11 Having produced 
Guilio Douhet, one of the earliest air power theorists, Italy also had the vision to use 
aircraft to their full effect. 
Finally, there were three other significant asymmetries between Italy and Ethiopia: 
logistics, command-and-control, communications and intelligence(C31), and special 
weapons. The Ethiopians were hampered logistically by their wide variety of types of 
government, such as the Azebu Gallas, also served Italy during the war. See A.J. Barker, The Civilizing 
Mission (New York: The Dial Press, 1968), 345-7. 
9 On land force asymmetries, see Baer, 224; Barker, 148-9; Del Boca, 37; James Dugan and 
Laurence Lafore, Days of Emperor and Clown (New York: Doubleday, 1973), 168-170; and Sullivan, 179. 
10 Del Boca, 91-92. 
11 Barker, 347. 
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weapons. Many of their soldiers carried the wrong ammunition for their personal 
weapons. As A.J. Barker noted, the Ethiopians: 
had no transport, no organized supply service, no medical 
arrangements, and when their own paltry rations ran out they had to 
depend on local supplies, or, like the Boer commandos, they had to 
return home. 12 
While the Italian supply situation was difficult, they could at least take care of their 
soldiers, move heavy weapons, and supply enough ammunition for the indiscriminate use 
of massed firepower. 
In terms of C31, Ethiopia had enough radios to provide communications between its 
armies. 13 Possession ofthis technology, however, did not ensure its use. Ras Mulugeta, 
the Minister of War, failed to take a field radio as he moved north with an army of 
80,000.14 The traditional nature of Ethiopia's leaders and army was not its only problem. 
Italy's efficient intelligence gathering operation had secured Ethiopia's codes. As Brian 
Sullivan noted, "throughout the war, the Italians would have detailed information on all 
Ethiopian plans, movements, and problems."15 
The final asymmetry was in what today is referred to as weapons of mass 
destruction. The Italians brought large quantities of chemical weapons, primarily mustard 
gas, into the theater. During the war, they would show little or no restraint in its use. 
Ethiopia had no ability either to respond in kind or to take defensive countermeasures. In 
his history of the war, Angelo Del Boca quoted a French journalist's prophecy of the war 
and then commented on how accurate yet incomplete it was: 
"Before [the Ethiopians] meet the Europeans, they will endure five 
levels of hell. The bombs from the air. The shelling from long-range 
12 Ibid., 149. 
13 Sullivan, 180. 
14 Information from George Steer, Caesar in Abyssinia, as quoted in Leonard Mosley, Haile 
Selassie (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), 202. 
15 Sullivan, 182. 
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howitzers. The deadly sputter of machine guns. The tanks. The 
Askaris." He forget to mention a sixth and even more frightful hell-
the hell of mustard gas. 16 
Against these asymmetries, Haile Selassie could counter with a only partially asymmetric 
strategy. 
3. Asymmetric Strategy 
In the introduction, military strategy was described as having two key components: 
the center of gravity and the operational pattern. The Italian strategy focused on traditional 
centers of gravity: the Ethiopian army and the capital of Addis Ababa. To attack these 
critical points, the Italians used a sequential strategy of major battles to annihilate the 
Ethiopian forces and gain access to the capital. Against the Italians, Haile Selassie devised 
a strategy which was only partially asymmetric. 
Haile Selassie realized he could not win a military confrontation with Italy. Del 
Boca quotes Selassie as saying, "We did not even contemplate fighting a European-style 
war. Moreover, it would have been impossible, as what we had in the way of artillery, 
even machine guns, was laughable."17 To prevent or win the oncoming war, Selassie 
chose an abstract center of gravity; all hope of victory was placed on mobilizing the moral 
support of the world to limit Italy's freedom of action within the international system. 
External support and foreign intervention became the tool which Selassie sought to leverage 
to affect this center of gravity. By appealing to the League of Nations and various great 
powers, the Emperor hoped to gain both support for his cause and international action to 
stop or rollback the Italian offensive. 
Ethiopia sought to invoke the conflict-resolution and collective security terms of the 
League of Nations. Immediately after the W al-W al border incident which Italy used as a 
pretext for its pre-offensive mobilization, Ethiopia went to the League of Nations. In the 
nine months before the war and after its initiation, Ethiopia would continue to make appeals 
16 Pierre Bonardi, cited in Del Boca, 198. 
17 Del Boca, 37. 
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to the League. 18 Selassie also attempted to grant oil concessions to American firms to gain 
the support of the United States.19 The Roosevelt administration, however, managed to 
have the concessions canceled; America would not compromise its isolation for unproven 
oil reserves. 
To reach this center of gravity once the invasion began, however, Selassie used an 
operational pattern which could not directly or indirectly achieve or support his goals. 
Selassie and his army did not fight a 'guerrilla war.' Instead of choosing such a 
cumulative-exhaustion approach, which might have bought time for popular support 
around the world to force governments into action, Selassie's forces fought a series of 
sequential battles which sought the annihilation of Italian forces. While the Emperor 
realized the impossibility of fighting a 'modern war' of this manner, he was forced to 
accept it because of the traditional nature of his army and the ethnic divisions of his 
country. The nature of these factors and their influence will be discussed in a later section. 
Compounding the error of this choice, the Emperor both delayed the mobilization of 
his forces to the last minute before the invasion and withdrew his forward forces at least 
thirty kilometers south of the border.20 While these actions pleased the League of Nations, 
they made a poor operational pattern worse. And other options which might have made a 
sequential-annihilation pattern possible, such as a preemptive offensive against Italian ports 
in Eritrea, were rejected. Selassie's choice of center of gravity prevented their 
consideration. In the end, this partially asymmetric strategy resulted in defeat. Although 
the choice of an abstract center of gravity, using the international system to gain support 
18 See Baer, esp. 99, 111-112, 115, 234-5, 315. 
19 See Brice Harris, The United States and the ltalo-Ethiopian Crisis (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1964), 35-38. 
20 Selassie waited until September 28 to mobilize his army; Del Boca, 37. On his withdrawal to 
create a neutral zone, see Del Boca, 45-47. 
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and stop Italy, had some promise, the use of a sequential operational pattern meant the war 
would be fought on Italy's terms. 
4. The Course of the War and its Outcome: 
Italian forces crossed the border in the north from Eritrea on October 3, 1935. 
Because Ethiopian forces had withdrawn to create a thirty-kilometer neutral zone, the 
invading army initially made a rapid advance and seized Adowa and two other towns by 
October 6. Their advance was also helped by the defection of one of Selassie's princes 
with his small army?1 The underdeveloped country and the logistical demands for such a 
large modern army, however, prevented an Italian blitzkrieg-like strike all the way to the 
capital. By November 7, the need to fix the supply situation halted the Italians after the 
seizure of the town of Makalle. 
Because Mussolini feared the risk of international involvement in the conflict, he 
replaced his first commander-in-chief, de Bono, with Marshal Pietro Badoglio in mid-
November. After the delay at Makalle, Mussolini regarded de Bono as insufficiently 
aggressive to pursue a quick end to the campaign. Badoglio prepared to resume the 
offensive, but his plans were disrupted by a Ethiopian counterattack beginning December 
15. Selassie's forces launched an attack with elements of three large armies to tum the 
Italian's right flank. The Ethiopian armies, however, made lucrative targets for Italian 
firepower and poison gas, the latter of which was first used in the war on December 23.22 
With these weapons, the Italians managed to break up and destroy the large Ethiopian 
formations and end their "Christmas Offensive." A similar pattern would be repeated in all 
the major battles of the war. 
In the southeastern portion of Ethiopia, Italian plans to launch a ground offensive 
out of Somalia had been delayed by heavy rains in October. Throughout October and 
November, however, Ethiopian forces had been subjected to aerial attack. Tormented by 
21 Mosley, 198-200. 
22 Del Boca, 78-81. 
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their inability to respond to such an air assault, the Ethiopians ventured forward to mount a 
preemptive strike against the Italian bases in Somalia. Unfortunately, such an attack 
required a movement of over 400 kilometers in largely open terrain. Ethiopian logistics 
were not up to the task, their communications had been intercepted by the Italians, and air 
power bled their long warrior columns along the entire route. By the time General Graziani 
initiated the first major Italian offensive from Somalia on January 12, 1936, his attack 
became a pursuit of the weakened and demoralized Ethiopian forces. 
In the north, a second Ethiopian counterattack on January 19 failed in less than six 
days. The Italians then regained the initiative and decimated Ethiopian forces in three major 
battles from 10 February through March 3. In late March, Haile Selassie was forced to 
venture out of the capital with his strategic reserve and move north to stabilize the situation. 
His forces launched a final counterattack at Mai Chew on March 30. Despite the brave 
fighting of Selassie's best forces, they were repulsed. On their retreat towards the capital, 
they were then decimated by unrelenting air attacks. On May 1, 1936, Ethiopia's emperor 
left his country, going into exile in Europe. Badoglio' s forces entered the capital on May 5 
and linked up with Graziani's forces on May 9. On the same day, Mussolini proclaimed 
victory in Rome. 
The war effort was not cheap for Italy. Over 360,000 military personnel and 
civilian workers served in East Africa during the war.23 The Italians, not including their 
colonial troops, had lost at least two thousand killed.24 Italy also had spent almost 12.1 
billion lire on the war effort, equivalent to $10 billion in 1970, an astronomical sum for a 
country struggling to recover from economic depression. 25 
23 See Barker, 348; Sullivan, 185, mentions a higher figure of over 600,000. 
24 see Barker, 316; Dugan, 295; Sullivan, 185, again mentions a higher figure of 10-12,000 
Italians killed, and around 200,000 wounded or stricken with disease. 
25 Dugan 295; Sullivan, 185, gives a higher figure of 38.9 billion lire. 
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The cost to Ethiopia was far worse. An estimated 275,000 warriors and civilians 
were killed. 26 Many towns had been destroyed. Their government had been driven . 
abroad. In spite of this death and destruction, some Ethiopians genuinely welcomed the 
onset of foreign rule. 27 This situation would change, however, as Italian control and 
repression of the populace grew. 
The conventional war which ended in May 1936 was followed by guerrilla 
operations from a few remnants of Selassie's army. This initial resistance was eliminated 
by mid-February 1937.28 But brutal Italian reprisals in response to an assassination attempt 
on the governor general, eliminated any goodwill towards the Italians and sparked further 
low-level resistance. This popular resistance was sporadic, unorganized, and resulted in 
the slaughter of 300,000-400,000 more Ethiopians for little gain.29 Even though the 
occupation of Ethiopia continued to require a large commitment of Italian resources, only 
the beginning of World War IT and the intervention of British forces would return Haile 
Selassie to his throne. 
B. HYPOTHESES APPLIED TO THE ITALO-ETHIOPIAN WAR 
1. Skilled Army 
In the introduction, skill was described as a concept which must be considered 
relative to an opponent, not in isolation. Additionally, three questions were presented as 
the basis for evaluating the skill of a technologically disadvantaged army. These questions 
are: has the army of the weaker state been able to adapt to the disadvantaged circumstances 
26 Barker, 316; Del Boca, 274-275, Sullivan, 185. 
27 
"Despite this cruelty, many educated Ethiopians had rallied to the Italians, including Ethiopians 
who returned from Europe." Sullivan, 187. 
28 Sullivan, 187. 
29 Ibid., 194. 
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under which it is fighting? Has it been able to develop effective responses to counter the 
opponent's technology? And is the army still able to conduct operations which support the 
leadership's strategy for victory? Haile Selassie's army was both unskilled relative to the 
Italians and it failed to meet all three measures. 
The Italian army that Ethiopia faced was neither of high nor uniform quality. It 
consisted of regular army soldiers, hastily recruited and trained Fascist 'blackshirts', and 
colonial levees. 30 These forces were organized under contemporary European lines and 
responded to a centralized headquarters. While Italian forces would prove themselves 
generally unskilled relative to their opponents in World War II, their level or training, 
organization, and weaponry would prove more than an match for Haile Selassie's army. 
As George Baer noted: 
The Italian army of 1935 was not the careless and harried army of 1896, 
but a knowledgeable, mobilized armored force capable of breaking up 
frontal assaults and mass attacks with artillery fire, with machine guns, 
and above all with bombings and strafings from the air.31 
With the advantage of superior firepower, the quality ofltaly's military was good enough 
to defeat an army stuck to the methods of the nineteenth century. 
The nature of the Ethiopia's army was sufficient for victory in 1896, but obsolete 
by the standards of the 1930s. Only a small portion of his force could be considered 
"professional" in the contemporary usage of the word.32 The majority of the warriors were 
mobilized in separate armies led by warrior princes. With titles like Fitorari or "Front of 
the Rhinoceros", these princes were expected to lead their mass armies from the front into 
decisive battles with the enemy. These leaders and their warriors felt a great confidence in 
their skills. The memories of their previous victory at Adowa in 1896 had fed what Haile 
Selassie recognized as the two worst faults of his people: "overweening bravery and 
30 Barker, 156-160. 
31 Baer, 223. 
32 On the nature of the Ethiopian army, see Baer, 222-3; Barker, 147-9. 
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superlative arrogance.'m Because of these attitudes and Ethiopia's isolation from the 
world, the army neither equipped itself for modem warfare, nor did it seek to understand 
the trends in technology, organization, and tactics which had arisen since 1896. 
In the fighting that began on October 1935, Ethiopia had little success in countering 
the land and air forces of Italy. Ethiopian warriors disabled tanks and killed their crews on 
a few occasions, but only through the intervention of luck and at great cost to themselves.34 
But for the most part, the common soldier and his leaders were too shocked at the brutal 
punishment dealt to them by aircraft, massed artillery, and poison gas. One warrior chief 
said in response to the use of mustard gas, "My chiefs surrounded me, asking wildly what 
they should do, but I was completely stunned. I didn't know what to tell them. I didn't 
know how to fight this terrible rain that burned and killed.''35 The Emperor himself was 
one of the few who understood the nature of the modem weapons facing Ethiopia; Selassie 
personally drafted tactical drills in response to the air threat. 36 His singular efforts, 
however, could not be disseminated and adopted in time by such a large, decentralized, and 
self-confident force. 
Finally, Selassie's army was incapable of executing anything but a sequential 
operational pattern which sought the annihilation of the enemy. Because of the traditions 
and attitudes mentioned earlier, Ethiopia's warrior-leaders( except for Selassie) rejected the 
possibility of a cumulative-exhaustion campaign along the lines of guerrilla warfare. One 
prince responded to the emperor's suggestion of a cumulative-type campaign with, "A 
descendant of the Negus Yohannes makes war, but cannot carry on guerrilla warfare like a 
33 Mosley, 203. 
34 For two examples, see Del Boca, 75, 118. 
35 As quoted in David Large, "Mussolini's 'Civilizing Mission'," MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of 
Military History 5, no. 2 (Winter 1993), 52. 
36 One example of the Emperor's personal writings: "When an aeroplane is sighted, one should 
leave large open roads and wide meadows and march in valleys and trenches and by zigzag routes, along 
places which have trees and woods." From Haile Sellassie, The Autobiography of. .. , trans. by E. 
Ullendorff (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), 236-37. See also Mosley, 203-4. 
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brigand chief!"37 It should also be noted the ethnic makeup of Ethiopia also hindered the 
adoption of a guerrilla warfare strategy; this will be discussed in the next section. 
2. Will of the People 
The introduction listed some possible measures to evaluate the relative differential in 
national will between two powers and there effects on war. The measure are: Did either 
side restrain its operations due to any internal or external political considerations? Did 
either side face internal dissent to the war? If there was internal dissent, did it affect the 
national leadership in their choices about the conduct and continuation of the war? And did 
internal dissent have a resulting effect on the nation's military forces? While Italy was a 
cohesive nation with a relatively unified will to accept the costs and risks of war, Ethiopia 
was fractured by ethnic division and internal strife. Furthermore, Ethiopia's problems 
were compounded by its opponent. These internal problems both affected Ethiopia's 
strategic choices and reduced its military effectiveness. 
Mussolini had prepared his population well for war. As Angelo Del Boca 
remarked, "thirteen years of Fascist propaganda and indoctrination had made an indelible 
mark on the Italians, particularly on the younger generation."38 Italy was subjected to a 
barrage of revisionist calls for the revenge of Adowa. Britain's diplomatic efforts to 
prevent the war also played into Mussolini' s hands, uniting the Italian nation behind him in 
the face of such a strong "enemy."39 Italy had managed to obtain the blessing of prominent 
Catholic figures, although not the Pope himself. 40 An Italian writer who was not in 
37 Ras Seyoum, as quoted in Greenfield, 201. 
38 Del Boca, 26, see also Baer, 140-141. 
39 Baer, 158-9. 
40 Del Boca, 28, footnote 26. 
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sympathy with the Fascists later observed, "The vast majority of Italians, particularly the 
younger generation, hailed the colonial enterprise with sincere enthusiasm."41 
Ethiopia's population, however, was not similarly united for the defense of its 
country. Selassie's country was not fully a nation-state; it still bore much of its feudal 
identity. Provincial governments, with each with a separate ethnic majority, did not always 
recognize the Emperor's rule, nor did they always have harmonious relations with their 
neighboring provinces.42 Along with the traditional attitudes of the Ethiopian army, this 
ethnic diversity and tension would serve to prevent guerrilla warfare from being a feasible 
course of action. Ethnic antagonisms would have hindered the ability of warriors to obtain 
food, shelter, and other supplies from the populace.43 
Ethiopia's internal problems were exacerbated by Italian actions. The historian 
Richard Greenfield quoted a contemporary observer of Ethiopia during this time who 
"wrote of the damage being done to Ethiopia's national interests by local chiefs who had 
accepted Italian bribes:" 
They are hopelessly irreconcilable and say quite plainly "rather Italy than 
Haile Selassie". The emperor has many enemies who will make war and 
help the Italians to hunt him down. 44 
The first Italian commander-in-chief of the war effort estimated that their subversive efforts 
deprived Ethiopia of "at least 200,000 men who either did not take up arms or who, 
although enrolled and armed remained inert. "45 The Italians were perceptive enough not 
only to see the weaknesses in Selassie's country, but to take action to magnify them. 
41 Ruggero Zangrandi, as quoted in Del Boca, 26. 
42 Greenfield, 176-184. 
43 See Baer, 223-4; Sullivan, 180. 
44 Greenfield, 193. 
45 General de Bono, as quoted in Del Boca, 13. 
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3. External Support 
Despite a strategy which depended on external support, Ethiopia was unable to 
obtain much aid from foreign sources. Such aid was critical because Ethiopia could neither 
produce its own arms, nor match the Italian army and air force. The world's other 
significant powers failed to provide any such aid to Ethiopia because of their own concerns 
about preventing or avoiding war and other significant international problems, such as 
Germany's rising power. And while popular support for Ethiopia grew in many countries, 
the war did not last long enough for such support to push any government to take 
aggressive action against Italy. 
The League of Nations was dependent on British and French leadership. Yet these 
two nations were concerned with other problems, most notably Germany's rearmament.46 
As a result, France wanted Italy as an ally against the growing German threat. Britain, 
although a more ardent supporter of the league, had a strong pacifist movement and a fear 
of risking its own sea power.47 The only other major power with possible leverage, the 
United States, was not a member of the League and beset with its own domestic proclivity 
towards neutrality.48 As a result, the League and the other major powers were unable to 
take any decisive action to stop the war. 
Once the war began, the League was still unwilling to risk any action which might 
lead to a wider war. Minor sanctions were applied against Italy, but the one action which 
could cripple its war effort, oil sanctions, was avoided. 49 And although the League and its 
member nations agreed to prohibit arms sales to Italy, which was largely self-sufficient, it 
46 Baer, 100, Harris, 7. 
47 Baer, 269, on sea power, 258-259. 
48 Harris, 25. 
49 Harris, 70-71; see also Barker, chap. 10, 191-210. 
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made no effort to provide arms to Ethiopia. 5° By December 1935, instead of seeking to aid 
Ethiopia, Hoare and Laval, the foreign ministers of Britain and France, sought a 
compromise agreement which would retain the nominal independence of Ethiopia at the 
cost of much of its territory. Once revealed, however, this plan spurred public 
condemnation which cost Hoare his job, and undermined the League's attempts to secure 
American support for collective action. 5 1 
In contrast to the inaction of the leadership of the major powers, the common 
people of Britain and America generally demonstrated strong support for Ethiopia. Large 
rallies were held in Britain and the United States. 52 Citizens in both countries sent 
numerous letters of support to the emperor.53 Public opinion had caused Hoare's downfall 
and drove his replacement, Anthony Eden, towards decisive action. But the German 
occupation of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, distracted world attention away from 
Ethiopia.54 By the time the League again reconsidered Ethiopia, there was no hope of 
helping Haile Selassie and his country. 
Throughout the war, Ethiopia received little meaningful external support. The 
greatest contribution came from a few volunteer aviators, a handful of military advisers, 
and about fifty foreign doctors who attempted to provide aid to Selassie's large army.55 
But these efforts did not slow Italy's progress or mitigate their vicious prosecution of the 
war. Furthermore, no effort was made to correct Ethiopia's deficiencies in weaponry and 
ammunition. Ethiopia faced Italy with nothing but moral support. 
50 Harris, 71; European nations would not even supply credit to Ethiopia, see Baer 226-7; Mosley, 
194; ironically the only major wartime arms shipment to Ethiopia was rifles from Hitler, Del Boca, 132. 
51 Harris, 109-111. 
52 Del Boca, 41. 
53 Del Boca, 96-97; Harris, 92. 
54 Harris, 133-135. 
55 Del Boca, chap. 7, 85-97. 
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4. Opponent's Counter Strategy 
The fourth possible contextual variable we can examine is the presence and 
effectiveness of the opponent's counter strategy in the face of the weak state's asymmetric 
strategy. Has the enemy recognized the asymmetric strategy and developed 
countermeasures? If so, how effective are they? In the case of the ltalo-Ethiopian war, 
Italy both perceived the threat from Haile Selassie's choice of a center of gravity and took 
effective measures to protect their own strategy. 
Ethiopia's hope was to use the League of Nations to gain external support to deter, 
prevent, or repel Italy's aggression. Mussolini recognized the threat from this strategy both 
before and during the war. George Baer's chronicle of the months prior to the war 
demonstrates the deliberate Italian diplomatic manipulation of the League's processes and 
great power politics to prevent foreign intervention. By requests for delays, unresponsive 
replies, and the interjection of tangential issues, Italy managed to prevent the League from 
considering any substantive issue which could have slowed or prevented the Italian buildup 
prior to the invasion. 56 
From the onset of the war to its conclusion, Italy deliberately manipulated 
information and perceptions to undermine external support for Ethiopia. Italy attempted to 
claim its aggression was within the League's mandate. Ethiopia was presented as hostile 
because of its mobilization for war and unfit for League membership because of its 
tolerance of slavery. This action delayed the League's response to the invasion. Combined 
with veiled threats to oppose any external intervention, this sufficed to deter the League 
from taking any action significant enough to harm Italy's war effort. To sway the 
Americans, who were outside the League, Mussolini allowed President Roosevelt's 
personal representative, William Donovan, to visit his army in Ethiopia. Marshal Badoglio 
56 Baer, esp. 105-106; 243. 
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managed Donovan's access so that he left with the impression that any American effort to 
help the Ethiopians would be futile. 57 
Following the use of chemical weapons, Italy also distributed disinformation to 
undermine external public reaction. Italy's response included denials that any such 
weapons were used and claims of legitimate reprisal against the Ethiopian use of dumdum 
bullets. 58 To propagate messages like this, Italy sent to Ethiopia Italian writers and foreign 
correspondents who were in sympathy with the fascist government. 59 Italy both realized 
the potential harm that foreign support and intervention could have and took measures to 
prevent it. Although Italy's actions could not erase the popular support that Ethiopia 
received, especially in Britain and America, they slowed and limited the responses of the 
political elites in those countries and others. 
C. CONCLUSION 
From 1935 and into 1936, Emperor Haile Selassie and Ethiopia attempted to fight 
Italy with a partially asymmetric strategy, as shown in Figure 3. In the face ofltaly's 
asymmetric technology and weapons, Selassie used an abstract center of gravity, a moral 
appeal to gain foreign support to limit Italy's freedom of action within the international 
system, as the focus of his strategy. Wedded to this, however, was a more traditional 
sequential operational pattern which sought the annihilation of the invading forces. 
57 Account contained in James Dunnigan and Albert Nofi, Victory and Deceit (New York: Morrow, 
1995), 154-6. 
58 Del Boca, 81-84. 
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Figure 3. Strategic Options Matrix for the ltalo-Ethiopian War 
Ultimately, Selassie and Ethiopia suffered a massive defeat. The Italians overran 
the capital, inflicting hundreds of thousands of military and civilian casualties. This 
outcome was directly due to the four variables, none of which was weighted in Ethiopia's 
favor. The unskilled Ethiopian army could neither stop the Italian army, nor inflict heavy 
casualties on the invaders. Ethiopia's national will was not as solid as Italy's. Haile 
Selassie could not count on the support of all his people, even in the face of a foreign 
invasion; as a result, the Ethiopians lost around 200,000 possible soldiers and the Italians 
gained significant intelligence. External support, which was central to Ethiopia's strategy, 
consisted of only a handful of advisors, pilots, and doctors and no material to help counter 
Italy's technological advantage. Finally, Italy recognized the possibilities and dangers of 
Ethiopia's strategy and took actions to counter it. The critical factors were stacked against 
Ethiopia and the outcome of the war reflected this. 
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IV. THE RUSSO-FINNISH WAR(1939-1940) 
A. THE CONFLICT 
1. Background 
The early history of Finland is the story of a small nation caught between two great 
empires. Two authors described Finland's situation as having been "a punching bag for 
her powerful neighbors; first Sweden, then Russia."1 Before the nineteenth century, 
twelve major wars were fought between Finland's neighbors on her own soil. Finally, in 
1809, Finland was ceded to Russia. Despite such a turbulent history, the fierce 
determination of the Finnish people preserved their cultural independence. 
Finland gained special strategic significance for Russia in 1703 when Peter the 
Great selected the site for his new capital, St. Petersburg. The location of the city, which 
would later be known during the Soviet era as Leningrad, meant that Finland's Karelian 
Isthmus was a strategic offensive route into this important Russian city. Russia maintained 
its security by administering Finland as a Grand Duchy throughout the nineteenth century. 
Relations were generally harmonious until Czar Alexander ill came to power in 1881. 
Increasing oppression through 1914 led many Finns to begin plotting, acting, and fighting 
for political independence. Finland got its wish in 1917 when Russia was engulfed in the 
chaos of Lenin's revolution. 
Following its revolution, until the 1920s, the Soviet Union was too preoccupied 
with internal difficulties to allocate attention and resources to external strategic concerns. 
During this time, Finland also experienced a civil war in which a revolutionary uprising 
was crushed by military force. By 1938, Russia was again concerned with external issues 
such as a nascent right-wing movement in Finland and the military balance vis-a-vis 
1 Quotation from Eloise Engle and Lauri Paananen, The Winter War (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole 
Books, 1973), xii. Historical information is drawn from their introduction and William Trotter, A Frozen 
Hell (Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 1991), 3-22. 
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Germany.2 To secure the approaches to Leningrad, Russia sought to "improve relations" 
with Finland. Diplomatic efforts towards this end failed, because the Finns were unwilling 
to cede islands in the Gulf of Finland and other territory requested by Russia. 
In August 1939, the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement reduced Stalin's 
strategic concerns and allowed him to devote heavy-handed attention to Finland. To create 
a security buffer around Leningrad, Stalin demanded major adjustments to Finland's 
borders. Negotiations on this issue continued from the beginning of October until the ninth 
of November and failed to produce any results. Less than twenty days later, Russia 
invaded Finland. 
2. Asymmetric Weapons and Technology 
Finland went to war in 1939 with both qualitative (in terms of weapons) and 
quantitative disadvantages. While the disparity between the Soviet Union and Finland in 
terms of technology was not as pronounced as between Italy and Ethiopia, the quantitative 
difference was much greater. A nation of less than 4 million with an armed force of less 
than 300,000 was standing up to a nation of around 190 million who initially would send 
forward about a half million fighting men. 3 The Russian force would be further increased 
in size as the prospect of a quick victory disappeared. 
In terms of small arms, the Finns and the Russians were at a rough parity. In the 
other weapons of land warfare, the Finns were disadvantaged. Most of Finland's artillery 
dated from World War I; cannon like these were in short supply, so antique weapons from 
the late 1800's were pressed into service.4 The Finnish armored force of less than fifty 
obsolete vehicles was irrelevant in the face of 3,300 Soviet tanks. Also troubling for 
2 The Lapuan Movement was generally small and incompetent, but it managed to kidnap Finland's 
retired first president in 1931 and attempt a coup in 1932. See Trotter, 8-9. 
3 Yohanan Cohen, Small Nations in Times of Crisis and Confrontation, trans. Nafta1i Greenwood 
(Albany: State University Press of New York, 1989), 263-4, 319. 
4 Allan Chew, The White Death (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1971), 23. 
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Finland was the lack of antitank weapons. The army received its first antitank guns only a 
few weeks before the beginning of the war. Only one hundred were received in this first 
shipment from Sweden. Finland's initial encounters with modem armored forces would be 
traumatic as a result. 5 
On land, Finland had a few advantages. Simple fortifications and skiing ability, not 
technology, would serve as combat multipliers for the Finnish Army. In the south, Finland 
had erected a series of defensive fortifications known as the Mannerheim Line. Despite 
later Soviet claims that the Mannerheim Line was "created according to the latest word in 
equipment," it was much less than a modem defensive position like the Maginot Line in 
France.6 Finland's defenses were comprised of about 109 strong points and associated 
obstacles over seventy kilometers; they lacked the weapons, depth, and complexity of the 
French fortifications.7 
Finland's other advantage was the skiing ability of its troops. Almost every 
Finnish soldier was a cross-country skier.8 This national skill gave the Finns an advantage 
in tactical mobility, despite the mechanization of their opponents. Soviet troops with little 
or no skiing ability were limited to plodding on foot through the thick woods or traveling in 
vehicles along narrow roads. Meanwhile, the Finns could travel quickly through the 
forests, attack the Soviets unexpectedly, and withdraw into the woods, preventing any 
pursuit. 
The situation in the air was more symmetric in terms of technology. But the vast 
numerical superiority of the Russians created an asymmetry in the primary mission of each 
air force. Russia's aircraft would be used for offensive purposes, while Finnish planes 
5 On land force asymmetries, see Chew, 19, 23-4; Cohen, 264-5; Trotter, 43-47. 
6 
"Excerpts on Soviet 1938-40 Operations from The History of Warfare, Military Art, and Military 
Science, a 1977 Textbook of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces," 
Journal of Slavic Military Studies 6, no.l (March 1993): 124. 
7 Trotter, chap. 6, 62-66. 
8 Chew, 27-28. 
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were primarily relegated to the defense. Russia would initially field about 800 aircraft 
against roughly 160 Finnish planes. Finland also possessed effective antiaircraft artillery.9 
Of the Finnish aircraft, about fifty were of sufficiently modem design to directly challenge 
the Russians in the air. 10 The remainder were less modem, including some open cockpit 
biplanes which were pressed into reconnaissance duties. Yet, because of the numerical 
balance, the Finnish Air Force was essentially a defensive force. While the Soviet air force 
would fly numerous strategic bombing missions and provide constant tactical support to its 
ground troops, the Finns were rarely able to deliver bombs against enemy troops, airfields, 
or cities. 
Asymmetries in three other areas were of mixed importance. On the sea, the naval 
balance was largely irrelevant. By late December, the Gulf of Finland began to freeze over; 
encounters prior to this were generally ship-to-shore gunnery duels with little strategic 
effect. 11 In C3I, the Finns lacked tactical radio communications below the regimental 
level. 12 Wire communications proved to be a highly vulnerable substitute, but the nature of 
Finnish tactical doctrine meant that this was not a critical problem. Small Finnish units 
were trained to take the initiative and fight in the absence of communications with higher 
headquarters. Finally, logistically the Soviet Union had a great advantage. Unlike 
Finland, the Russians had both a large armament industry and massive stockpiles of 
ammunition, fuel, and other consumables. At the beginning of the war, Finland had only a 
twenty day supply of artillery shells and a month's worth of aviation fuel. 13 
9 Trotter, 192. 
10 On the air power balance, see Engle and Paananen, chap. 8, 56-62; H.M. Tillotson, Finland at 
Peace and War (Norwich, U.K.: Michael Russell, 1993), 154; and Trotter, chap. 15, 187-193. 
11 Trotter, 54-57. 
12 Chew, 23. 
13 Trotter, 43. 
42 
While Finland was not as technologically disadvantaged as the Ethiopians, she did 
labor under some serious asymmetries. Most notable were the near total lack of counters to 
a modem mechanized ground force of the type that had recently proven itself in Poland and 
Manchuria, the inability of the air force to provide consistent tactical support or conduct 
strategic bombing, and a short supply of munitions and fuel along with an associated 
dependence on external supplies. 
3. Asymmetric Strategy 
Russia attacked Finland with a traditional great power strategy. The massed 
armored might of the Red Army was to cross the border and seize the entire country. The 
Russians, in shifting from diplomacy to war, had also shifted their war aims. They 
intended to quickly conquer all of Finland and convert it "into an obedient satellite."14 
As the war began, Finnish strategy was in the hands of one man, Marshal Carl 
Gustav Mannerheim, the Chairman of the Defense Council and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces. Mannerheim, a man of impressive experience and intelligence, had earlier 
recommended that Finland accede to Russia's diplomatic demands for territory. 15 
Mannerheim had correctly calculated that Finland's refusal would not end Russian efforts 
to obtain the land. Yet, even after his advice was tragically ignored, Mannerheim stepped 
forward to wage a brilliant military campaign. 
Mannerheim fought the Russians with a partially asymmetric strategy which was 
the reverse of the Ethiopians. While the Ethiopians had focused on an abstract center of 
gravity, hoping to gain foreign intervention to constrain the Italians, Mannerheim and 
Finland would directly attack the military forces of the Soviet Union. Unlike the 
Ethiopians, however, Mannerheim would not risk all in a sequential campaign of decisive 
14 Max Jacobson, The Diplomacy of the Winter War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 
167-8. 
15 Mannerheim's career included service as a cavalry officer in the Imperial Russian army and 
leadership of the victorious White Finnish forces during the civil war. See Oliver Warner, Marshal 
Mannerheim and the Finns (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1967). 
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battles between large formations. Finland would attack the Soviet military with a 
cumulative strategy of many small unit actions. 
By 1939, the Finns realized that external support from either the League of Nations, 
Germany, or America was an unlikely proposition. Britain and France, the League's 
leadership, had proven impotent in earlier crises and were now involved in the Phony War 
with Germany. Germany, a potential ally of Finland, had signed a non-aggression pact 
with Russia and was not yet ready to break with its partner in the east. America was still 
working to keep itself out of European troubles. While external support was diplomatically 
sought and used as a tool for negotiations with the Russians, it was not the focus of 
Finland's strategy. 
Instead, the Finns devoted their efforts into attacking the most tangible center of 
gravity possible: the Russian army now inside their borders. To do this, Finland used a 
cumulative approach of small unit attacks against the ponderous Russian formations. Only 
once during the war would Finland attempt a sequential-type counterattack using 
divisions. 16 All of its other actions would be small bands of soldiers raiding on skis or 
fighting from isolated strongpoints along various defensive lines. 
4. The Course of the War and its Outcome: 
Bombs began to fall on Helsinki on November 30, 1939. The Soviet Union 
launched an offensive of unexpected size and intensity along almost the entire front of the 
border. 17 In the far north, a force of two divisions moved to seize the port of Petsamo on 
the Arctic Sea. In central Finland, five divisions attacked to divide the country at its narrow 
'waist.' The Soviet main effort, however, was in the south. On the north and south sides 
of Lake Ladoga, large forces, each over seven divisions in strength, attacked to seize the 
Karelian Isthmus and open up the road to Helsinki. 
16 Chew, 65-69. 
17 Prior to the invasion, the Finns estimated the Soviets would only be able to field thirteen 
divisions along the border. Their actual invasion day force was over twenty-one divisions. See Chew, 6; 
Trotter, 43. 
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The Russians had expected to achieve rapid success along the entire front with their 
material preponderance and massive firepower. In the first phase of the war, however, 
they would only secure Petsamo in the far north. After recovering from the initial shock of 
the invasion, the Finns put up a determined resistance. The Finns were helped by weather 
conditions described as "one of the most brutal the northland had ever seen since 
meteorological records started being kept in 1828."18 Finnish forces used an active defense 
of company and battalion-sized raids and ambushes against vulnerable Russian flanks and 
supply lines. The cumulative effect of these small-scale attacks divided the heavy, road-
bound Russian divisions into smaller subunits and isolated them from supplies and 
reinforcements. 19 Having reduced the Red Army's formations to pieces of a more 
manageable size and strength, the Finnish Army then massed the necessary firepower to 
rout or destroy the demoralized Russians. By December 23, Russian forces on the north 
side of Lake Ladoga were defeated and driven back to the border. By January 8, 1940, the 
two lead divisions in central Finland were annihilated. 
At this point, there was a relative lull in the fighting. In the face of such 
overwhelming setbacks, the Russians took the time to reinforce and reorganize their forces. 
They resumed the offensive in the beginning of February. Instead of attempting to take all 
of Finland, the Soviets attacked with twenty-three divisions in the area ofLake Ladoga and 
the Karelian Isthmus. By February 11, they had breached the Mannerheim Line. Against 
the now coordinated Red armor and artillery, Finnish forces could not find vulnerabilities 
to attack. They continued, however, to offer fierce resistance and withdrew in good order. 
By March 1, the Soviets encircled the key town ofViipuri on the western end of the 
Karelian Isthmus. 
18 Trotter, 145. 
19 These operations were described in the Western press of the time as Motti tactics, a deliberate 
Finnish innovation. More recent scholarship has shown that the motti term was little more than a 
descriptive term added after the fact to describe the rational tactics of a infantry force against a road bound 
armor force in close terrain. See Tillotson, 141; Trotter, 130-33. 
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At this point, Mannerheim realized that Finland must sue for peace. The new 
Soviet offensive was rapidly depleting Finnish resources. The vague promises of British 
and French intervention were unlikely to be fulfilled in time, or at all. Unlike his generals, 
Mannerheim believed that the fighting must be ended as soon as possible. 20 Observing that 
a full-scale collapse would result in Soviet occupation, Mannerheim pushed the civilian 
leadership to accept terms quickly. The Finns had earlier begun tentative negotiations for 
peace in January. On March 13, 1940 a peace treaty was signed. Finland lost much more 
land than Stalin had demanded in 1939, about 25,000 square miles of territory, including 
the entire Karelian Isthmus. In return, the Soviet Union had forsaken the goal of total 
victory and Finland maintained its independence. 
Both sides paid a heavy human and material price. In this short war of less than 
four months, Finland lost about 25,000 soldiers killed and 44,000 wounded. At least 
2,000 Finnish buildings had been destroyed by air attack alone.21 On the Russian side, 
official figures put their losses at 49,000 dead and 159,000 wounded, but it is likely that 
the actual numbers were much higher.22 The Soviet Union also lost at least 500 aircraft and 
2,300 armored vehicles. 23 
Following the war, Finland would form a partnership, but not full alliance, with 
Germany. In support of Hitler's invasion of Russia, Finland would regain its lost 
territory. Finnish troops, however, would not take part in the siege of Leningrad or further 
incursions into Russia. With the coming of the Russian counter-offensive in 1944 and the 
20 Warner, 157. 
21 Trotter, 188. 
22 Soviet figures cited from Trotter, 263. Trotter also mentions the estimates of Finnish 
historians: 230-270,000 killed and 200-300,000 wounded. Nikita Khrushchev is also cited as stating, "We 
lost a million men." 
23 Tillotson, Appendix 6, 20. Mannerheim estimated 1,000 Soviet aircraft were lost. See Engle 
and Paananen, 143. 
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Allied victory in 1945, Finland would again be reduced to its post-Winter War borders 
again, but would remain an independent country. 
B. HYPOTHESES APPLIED TO THE RUSSO-FINNISH WAR 
1. Skilled Army 
Relative to Russia, Finland managed to maintain a positive skill differential. 
Furthermore, the technologically inferior Finns demonstrated remarkable innovation in 
fighting the mechanized forces of the Red Army. The Russians, however, managed to 
narrow the skill gap by the war's end, allowing their quantitative advantages to become 
decisive. 
The Red Army which entered Finland in 1939 was a force which had suffered from 
Russia's revolutionary change, and expected tanks and numbers to compensate for skill. 
Stalin's recent purges had eliminated eighty to ninety percent of officers with operational 
experience at the regimental level or higher.24 The revolution had also ushered in a system 
of dual-command by military officers and political commissars which meant that sound 
tactical logic often received short shrift, even during the conduct of operations.25 Finally, 
Russia's recent victories over the Japanese in Manchuria had given the military and political 
leaders a false sense of confidence. The Russian victory at Khalkin-Gol and the German 
blitzkrieg in Poland inflated the Red leadership's expectations of armored forces and 
undermined any consideration of the severe winter conditions they would face. The initial 
invasion forces carried propaganda materials instead of skis and winter camouflage. 26 
While the individual Soviet soldier was usually courageous, in Finland he was initially led 
24 Tillotson, 122. 
25 Trotter, 35. 
26 Ibid., 37. 
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by inexperienced officers who understood little about large unit operations or winter 
warfare. 
Finland's army, despite its greater material limitations, had prepared itself well for 
the circumstances it would face. Realizing it could not field a mass armored force like the 
Soviets or other major European nations, Finland concentrating on training its soldiers in 
small-unit infantry skills. Building on the native skiing ability of most Finns, the army was 
prepared to fight under the most severe conditions possible. The Finnish foot soldier had 
trained on his home ground and developed good marksmanship, superior fieldcraft, and 
excellent small unit tactical proficiency. Their skills would earn them the nickname of 
Belaya Smert or "the White Death" from their poorly trained Russian opponents. 27 
The Finnish military leadership was also superior to the Soviet's. Finland had a 
cadre of men who had fought on their home soil during their own recent civil war and 
studied the specific military problems of winter warfare. One prominent example was 
Colonel Paavo Tal vela, a reservist who had written his war college thesis about 
hypothetical tactics and operations in the terrain on which he would later fight. 28 After 
reporting for duty and requesting a command from Mannerheim, Talvela went on to 
stabilize the front north of Lake Ladoga, push the Russians back, and win a battlefield 
promotion to Major General. While Talvela's story is especially notable, the Finns had 
similar leadership throughout all levels of command. 
While facing the Soviets, the Finns innovated to compensate for their lack of armor 
and antitank weapons. The presence and firepower of Red armor shocked Finnish troops 
for the first week or so of fighting.29 The Finns, however, responded with mines, satchel 
27 Ibid., chap. 12, 143-149. 
28 Engle and Paananen, 89. 
29 Chew, 19. 
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charges, and the "Molotov cocktail."30 These weapons required highly motivated infantry 
of which the Finns had no shortage. In a five-day period on the Karelian Isthmus, Finnish 
infantry managed to destroy eighty Soviet tanks.31 
The superior tactical skill of its infantry and the innovation of its people served 
Finland strategically. Because of its pre-war training, the Finnish army was built on 
confident, skilled small units which could execute the necessary tasks to support a 
cumulative strategy. Unlike the Soviets who were dependent on the synchronized use of 
massed armor and artillery, small Finnish units could maneuver on skis to ambush or raid 
the enemy's weak points. And these units possessed skilled leaders who could operate on 
their own initiative without the constant control or support of a higher headquarters. The 
cumulative effect of these small attacks was more than exhaustion in many cases; entire 
Soviet divisions were annihilated in the early phase of the war. 
By February, however, the Soviets had regrouped and retrained their forces. They 
quickly placed experienced officers in control of the operation.32 The new leaders put their 
troops through successive rehearsals to improve the coordination of their arms.33 New 
techniques such as ski detachments on the flanks of large units were used to reduce 
vulnerabilities.34 While this training did not bring Soviet skills up to the level of the Finns, 
it reduced the exploitable weaknesses which led to the annihilation of many units early in 
the war.35 During the February offensive, Finnish troops would continue to maintain a 
30 The gasoline-filled bottle bomb was apparently invented earlier during the Spanish Civil War, 
but it received its nickname in Finland. The Finns quickly produced the weapons, using 40,000 bottles 
from the State Liquor Board. See Trotter, 72-3; Engle and Paananen, chap. 5, 37-42. 
31 Engle and Paananen, 39. 
32 Chew, 77. 
33 Ibid., 141-2. 
34 A list of new techniques implemented is contained in the Main Command Directive of 28 
December 1939, discussed in "Excerpts ... "(fn.6), 131-2. 
35 Chew, 146-7. 
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positive exchange ratio of casualties, but it was reduced by an order of magnitude from 
what it had been. Instead of being routed or destroyed, the Soviets were now able to seize 
terrain and steadily push the Finns out of their prepared defensive positions. Most 
importantly, the limited Finnish supply of manpower and material was nearing the breaking 
point. The Soviets had finally raised their skill to a level where their superior numbers 
mattered. 
2. National Will 
The Soviet leadership had expected that there would be a relative differential of 
national willpower in their favor. With a brutal internal security system and a monolithic 
propaganda apparatus, the Soviet Union was firmly under Stalin's control. No organized 
dissent to the war would erupt in Russia.36 Stalin, however, perceived Finland as a nation 
with a suppressed class struggle. Once the Red Army crossed the border, the Finns were 
expected to become mired in internal conflict. But Stalin had been fed overly optimistic 
assessments of internal Finnish politics, largely because his advisors feared bringing him 
bad news.37 His hopes for a second Finnish revolution would remain unrealized. 
The Soviet invasion actually strengthened Finnish national will. Finnish 
communists, on the whole, chose to support their country instead of Stalin. Arvo 
Tuominen, the most respected Finnish communist, declined Stalin's request to form a new 
government.38 The Soviets were able to recruit less than 6,000 Finns to form a "People's 
Army of Finland" which saw almost no action. 39 On the other hand, many veterans of the 
36 Foreign diplomats reported that the war was widely unpopular among Soviet civilians. See 
Jacobson, 217. Of course, this was based on a survey of individual attitudes, not the presence of organized 
demonstrations. In the Red Army, morale actually improved during the war as the battle cry changed from 
"For Stalin" to "For the Fatherland" after the initial defeats. See Trotter, 205. 
37 Trotter, 18-19. 
38 Ibid., 59-60. 
39 Chew, 79; Jacobson, 170. 
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Finnish Red Guards from the 1918 civil war volunteered either to fight for their Fatherland 
or serve in civil defense organizations.40 
The Finnish nation as a whole responded unhesitatingly to the call for mobilization 
prior to the Soviet invasion. In a period of less than two months, the entire regular and 
reserve army had been mobilized and civil defense organizations were fully activated. 
About 100,000 men reported for the Civic Guards militia and 100,000 Finnish women for 
the Lotta Svard auxiliary which provided nurses, clerks, and other support personnel.41 
Finnish nationalism included a fierce contempt for Russians which overrode any 
considerations of class. 42 The nation as a whole fully embraced the war effort and would 
continue to do so until the end. 
3. External Support 
Finland received a higher degree of external support than Ethiopia had in its war. 
Moral and material assistance, along with a few volunteers, came from around the globe. 
This support helped compensate for Finland's lack of an armament industry and its prewar 
logistical constraints, but it could not replace the manpower lost in battle. Two other forms 
of external aid, moral support and the threat of foreign intervention, had little effect. 
The history of the war by Eloise Engle and Lauri Paananen contains the best 
accounting of external support. 43 At least eleven countries, including America, Britain, 
and Italy, made significant material donations to the Finns. These donations included over 
280 artillery pieces, 290 antitank guns, 460 antiaircraft guns, 150 aircraft and significant 
40 Chew, 24. 
41 Ibid., 26-7. 
42 One common Finnish saying was "One Finn is equal to ten Russians." See Jacobson, 172-3; 
Trotter, 40. 
43 Engle and Paananen, Appendix B, 153-157. Cohen, chap. 17,277-88, also provides a through 
review of foreign support. 
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ammunition stocks.44 Of less importance, over 10,000 foreign volunteers joined the 
Finnish side.45 These volunteers were usually poorly organized in small units with little or 
no preparation for fighting under winter conditions.46 
The remaining external support received by the Finns was relatively insignificant in 
terms of the war's outcome. Moral support in the form of popular expressions of 
sympathy were heard throughout the world.47 The League of Nations expelled the Soviet 
Union. 48 While these actions reinforced Finnish national morale, they did not improve 
Finland's long-term prospects for resisting the Red Army. 
The final type of external support received by Finland were the threats by Britain 
and France to send a large expeditionary force to Finland. 49 The impact of this possible 
intervention, however, should not be overstated. By January, the initial Soviet estimates of 
the time and cost of the war had been proven wrong and tentative peace negotiations had 
begun. The Finnish military strategy had forced the Soviets to reconsider their simple cost-
benefit analysis. The additional military costs to occupy the entire country would not be 
worth the benefit of total occupation, which was not one the goals of the Soviet's prewar 
diplomatic effort. When the possibility of Allied intervention gained strength in late 
February, it still was hampered by poor Allied planning, a very uncertain commitment to 
44 It should be noted than at least 50% of this equipment was obsolete by the standards of the day. 
Post-war Soviet accounts exaggerated the size and quality of external support to provide a partial 
explanation of the poor performance of the Red Army. See Cohen, 279; "Excerpts ... ", 127. 
_
45 The small number of volunteer pilots made some important contributions. In one case, a group 
of Swedish pilots flying obsolete biplanes managed to shoot down six Russian bombers. See Trotter, 190-
1. 
46 Mannerheim estimated he needed at least 30,000 trained fighting men to stabilize the front. See 
Cohen, 279. The poor quality of the volunteers of Kermit Roosevelt's "Finnish Legion" is especially 
notable. See Trotter, 194-5. 
47 Jacobson, 176-7. 
48 Ibid., 178-80. 
49 For a concise account of Allied bungling, see Jacobson, 197-253. Douglas Clark, Three Days 
to Catastrophe (London: Hammond, Hammond & Company, 1966), is a full volume on the topic. 
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the operation, and Norwegian and Swedish reluctance to provide transit rights. 5° That the 
Soviets considered the possibility of Allied intervention in moving towards a settlement is 
almost certain; that its prospects changed the outcome or made it possible is much less 
likely. At no time did the Soviets moderate their offensive to avoid provocation to the 
West, nor did they reduce their demands on the Finns to achieve a faster settlement. At 
most, the prospect of intervention only confirmed what was already clear on the battlefield; 
for the Soviets, the aim of taking all of Finland would not be worth the cost. 
4. Opponent's Counter Strategy 
Although the Soviets took some actions to undermine Finland's strategy, it is clear 
that they underestimated the Finns' will and capability to resist. Years after the war, Nikita 
Khrushchev reminisced that they had assumed that "all we had to do was raise our voices a 
little bit, and the Finns would obey. If that didn't work, we could fire one shot and the 
Finns would put up their hands and surrender."51 Soviet estimates of the time needed to 
complete the campaign ran from five to twelve days. 52 Extensive preparations by a great 
nation were rejected as unnecessary for the defeat of such a small country. 53 
The assumption that Soviet military might would quickly prevail was also combined 
with the assumption that a class-based revolution would erupt in Finland. As discussed 
earlier, Soviet actions to propagate such an event backfired. But because the Soviet 
strategy rested on these two optimistic assumptions, there was no attempt to counter a 
possible asymmetric strategy by the Finns. Early belligerent moves gave the Finns the time 
for full mobilization. 54 As a result, the Finnish Army was almost fully prepared to execute 
its cumulative strategy. The Russians had given no thought to preventing an early 
50 Jacobson, 218-9. 
51 As quoted in Trotter, 21. 
52 Chew, 20-1. 




mobilization or defeating possible Finnish asymmetric strategies. As a result, the Soviet 
Union would pay a high price in men and equipment in the war. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In 1939-40, Marshal Mannerheim and Finland used a partially asymmetric strategy 
to resist the Soviet invasion, as shown by Figure 4. With a predominantly infantry army, 
Finland attempted to fight and defeat the larger Soviet mechanized and air forces. Finland, 
choosing a traditional center of gravity, matched its military directly against the Soviets. 
The Finns, however, used a cumulative operational pattern which achieved more than just 













Figure 4. Strategic Options Matrix for the Russo-Finnish War 
Finland's strategy, however, in the end did not bring about victory. While the 
Soviet Union did not occupy Finland, it gained more territory than it had originally 
54 Chew, 26. 
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demanded. Finland's continued independence came at the price of some of its most 
significant lands. In this respect, the war for Finland was a partial defeat. 
Finland lost less badly than Ethiopia had in its war against the Italians of a few 
years earlier. Much of the differences in the success of the two countries was due to the 
differences in the four variables between the two countries. The superior skill of the 
Finnish Army allowed them consistently to inflict more casualties on the Soviets than they 
suffered themselves. While Ethiopia lost 200,000 or more men due to ethnic-based 
fissures in its national willpower, Finland lost 6,000 or less due to communist propaganda. 
In external support, Finland received significant quantities of material which helped their 
army continue to fight. Finally, the Soviet Union, unlike the Italians, underestimated their 
opponents and failed to consider what possible actions their weaker enemy might attempt. 
Finland fared better than Ethiopia, but the critical factors were still not all fully in its favor. 
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V. THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM(1965-1973) 
A. THE CONFLICT 
1. Background 
War against foreign domination has been a feature of the Vietnamese nationalist 
myth for hundreds of years.1 The wars in Indochina following World War IT are now part 
of that myth. Their scope, complexity, and duration greatly exceed that of the two wars 
considered earlier. The purpose of this case study, however, is not to review every part of 
the Indochina wars; instead, the focus will be on the North Vietnamese war to end direct 
American involvement in South Vietnam. 2 
Whether the main threat to South Vietnam was a conventional North Vietnamese 
enemy or a Viet Cong guerrilla army is still a highly contested proposition. Most American 
commentators see Harry Summers' On Strategy and Andrew Krepinevich's The Anny and 
Vietnam as representing the two poles of the issue.3 Both authors admit, however, to the 
presence of both types of combatants in the conflict. Overseas, despite wartime claims that 
North Vietnam was merely supporting an internal insurgency in South Vietnam, current 
1 As one Vietnamese text puts it, "Through the millennia of their history, the Vietnamese have 
often had to defend themselves against aggression coming from states far more powerful than themselves." 
This boqk documents battles from I 077 to 1789 to prove this point. See the forward to Pham Huy Le, 
Our Military Traditions (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1978(?)). Based on the author's 
personal experience, a tour of the history and military museums in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City makes 
this attitude very clear. 
2 The wars of Indochina include the Viet Minh war against the French; a communist insurgency in 
South Vietnam; the American-North Vietnamese War; the North Vietnamese War against South Vietnam; 
wars in Laos and Cambodia; and a Chinese border war with Vietnam in 1979. Background history for this 
section comes from Stanley Karnow, Vietnam (New York: Penguin, 1983); Robert Schulzinger, A Time 
for War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); and Harry Summers, Historical Atlas of the Vietnam 
War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995). 
3 Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986); Harry Summers, On Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1981). 
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Vietnamese historians claim that the war was always controlled and supported from the 
North. 4 While the author recognizes that guerrilla tactics were used and some South 
Vietnamese peasants were recruited into the struggle, this case will present the war as a 
conventional conflict in the sense that it was strategically directed and supported by a 
nation-state, North Vietnam.5 
Before World War II, Vietnam was a French colony. The Viet Minh, a nationalist 
movement (with communist overtones) which fought the Japanese and received U.S. 
support, had hoped for independence following W.W.II. Their dreams went unrealized 
with the return of the French in 1945. The Viet Minh movement then turned to violent 
action. Building an army with support from Chinese, they waged war from 1946 to 1954. 
The Viet Minh turned France's sequential strategy back on them, destroying a large force of 
their most elite troops at Dien Bien Phu. As a result, France lost its empire in Southeast 
Asia. At the Geneva Conference in 1954, a settlement was reached which called for the 
partition of the country into a communist north under Ho Chi Minh, a more traditional 
government in the south, and an eventual referendum to resolve the question of which 
system would rule a united country. 
The referendum was never held. By 1957, the Soviet Union proposed that North 
and South Vietnam be admitted to the United Nations as separate countries. Ngo Dinh 
Diem, the democratically elected President of South Vietnam, managed to defeat an armed 
non-communist resistance and the remnants of the Viet Minh in the south and establish 
control over most of his country. Seeing that internal disarray would not bring the south to 
its knees, North Vietnam decided to initiate a war against Diem's government. 
4 See Douglas Pike, PAVN (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986), 47-50. 
5 The author feels the evidence clearly shows that North Vietnam used and directly controlled the 
VietCong as one part of an overall strategy. Furthermore, it seems extremely doubtful that the VietCong 
insurgency could have achieved equivalent success without North Vietnamese forces, strategic direction, or 
logistic support. 
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In 1959, North Vietnam established the Central Office in South Vietnam (COSVN) 
to control the war effort. Four thousand Viet Minh veterans who had moved north after the 
1954 partition were sent south to become the core of the Viet Cong.6 At the time, North 
Vietnam took care to hide its involvement. As Douglas Pike found, the story now has 
changed; "Only now do Hanoi historians corroborate the fact that there was deep [North 
Vietnamese Army] command and control in the South from the earliest days, as well as 
systematic logistic support during the war."7 A military study team was dispatched from 
North Vietnam in 1963 to examine the question of committing regular forces to the fight. 8 
By the end of 1964, complete NVA tactical units were entering the Central Highlands of 
South Vietnam.9 
U.S. involvement followed a less deliberate track. Following the departure of the 
French, the U.S. began to support "nation-building" in South Vietnam. By 1961, there 
were 900 U.S. military advisors in country. By 1963, at the time of President Kennedy's 
death, there were 16,300. American casualties went from 14 in 1961 to nearly 500 in 
1963.10 America also supported South Vietnamese clandestine operations to gather 
intelligence on North Vietnam and disrupt their maritime resupply efforts to the VietCong 
in the south. 11 U.S. naval vessels were allegedly fired on by North Vietnamese gunboats 
attempting to repel these operations, resulting in the Gulf of Tonkin Congressional 
6 Summers, Atlas, 70. 
7 Pike, 47. 
8 Karnow, 331-334. 
9 This was a North Vietnamese attempt to finish the war because the VietCong had failed to 
produce decisive results. "In the autumn of 1964, General Giap committed two divisions of the regular 
North Vietnamese Army with the expectation that they would deliver the coup de grace in 1965." Allan 
Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 548. 
10 Millett and Maslowski, 546. 
11 These operations had begun as early as 1954. See Karnow, 363-4. 
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Resolution, a quasi-resolution of war. As Stanley Karnow noted, the resolution was 
conceived to give President Johnson wide strategic authority: 
His aides broadened the draft of the proposed congressional resolution 
so that it now authorized him to "take all necessary measures" to repel 
attacks against U.S. forces and to "prevent further aggression" as well 
as determine when "peace and security" in the area had been attained.12 
US ground forces were first committed in March of 1965. Although originally 
dispatched as airfield security, their mission expanded in April when they were authorized 
to conduct offensive operations. In 1965, U.S. strength in South Vietnam would jump 
from 23,300 to 184,300. The U.S. role shifted from advise and support to direct combat. 
2. Asymmetric Weapons and Technology 
In Vietnam, the asymmetries between combatants were in their overall systems and 
not only in individual platforms. American forces developed systems which leveraged 
technology to provide prodigious amounts of firepower, mobility, and intelligence. The 
North Vietnamese, on the other hand, were generally limited to fighting with weapons 
which had been around since the conclusion of World War II. 
One American historian and former air force officer claims that Vietnam was "the 
country that...suffered more bombardment than all others put together, in all previous 
wars."13 America possessed a number of significant platforms which fed into a system that 
could deliver massive firepower to. any part of Vietnam; these included jet fighter-bombers, 
B-52 strategic bombers, propeller-driven gunships, attack helicopters, large-caliber 
artillery, and battleships.14 Although North Vietnam used some cannon artillery in battles 
12 Ibid., 374. 
13 James P. Harrison, "History's Heaviest Bombing," in The Vietnam War, ed. by Jane Werner and 
Luu Doan Huynh (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 130. 
14 For an overview of the American firepower system, see Robert Scales, Firepower in Limited 
War (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995), 82-103,124. 
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near the demilitarized zone (DMZ), it had no comparable system to deliver massed 
firepower the way the Americans could to any location.15 
Only on their home soil could North Vietnam field a counter to American firepower. 
As Stanley Karnow recounts, with the support of the Soviet Union, 
the North Vietnamese developed one of the strongest air defense concentrations 
in the world, comprising eight thousand antiaircraft guns, more than two 
hundred surface-to-air missile[SAM] batteries, a complex radar system, and 
computerized control centers. 16 
In addition, the North Vietnamese possessed a number of MIG aircraft which they used for 
air defense north of the DMZ. These aircraft, which after 1967 grew in number to around 
two hundred, were always quantitatively overwhelmed by the two thousand or so aircraft 
that American and her allies could field. 17 Furthermore, North Vietnamese forces south of 
the DMZ were outside the MIG or SAM umbrella; they could only count on small arms or 
light cannon for air defense. 
In terms of mobility, while the North Vietnamese usually moved on foot, American 
soldiers could rely on helicopters or armored vehicles. The war was the first use of 
helicopters on a large scale for air mobility, fire support, medical evacuation and logistic 
resupply of ground troops. 18 North Vietnam never had an equivalent capability. The 
United States and its allies would also use mechanized forces in battalion strength or larger. 
North Vietnam would not field comparable forces until late in the war during the 1972 
offensive.19 
15 Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA (New York: Fawcett 
Columbine, 1992), 110. 
16 Karnow, 457. 
17 Harrison, 136. 
18 Shelby Stanton, The Rise and Fall of an American Army (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985), 91-95. 
19 The NV A did use a few tanks in two attacks against U.S. base camps in 1968-9. See Lanning 
and Cragg, 121. 
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In terms of C31, America developed many capabilities the North Vietnamese could 
not replicate. Not all of America's high technology, however, would prove to be effective. 
Remote electronic sensing and detection devices of various design were used by the United 
States.20 American forces were also fitted with early night-vision technology. An 
American infantry company could communicate on multiple radio nets simultaneously, 
linking it the vast firepower system that supported them. The equivalent North Vietnamese 
force had only one radio and usually poor supporting fires. 21 Overall, American 
communications provided their ground troops with a direct link to their supporting 
firepower system while their advanced electronic sensors worked with less reliability and 
did not lift the fog of war. The United States would discover that its technology and forces 
were not equally effective in all parts of the world. The varied terrain in Indochina, which 
included swamps, triple-canopy jungle, and rugged hills and small mountains, would often 
degrade the capabilities of America's technology-based systems. 
Although North Vietnam received some weapons from China and the Soviet Union 
which were as technologically sophisticated as their American counterparts, they would 
never have an interlocking system of technology that provided great quantities of 
firepower, mobility, and intelligence. North Vietnam was an agricultural society that 
rapidly learned to use a few of the modern implements of war. America was a 
technologically advanced society which would deliver around fifteen million tons of 
ordnance over seven years, develop a variety of electronic sensors, and experiment with 
tons of herbicides to change the battlefield environment.22 
2° For an brief overview of the U.S. sensor network, see Herman Gilster, The Air War in 
Southeast Asia (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1993), 18-19; and Paddy Griffith, Forward into 
Battle, (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1990), 143-44. 
21 See Lanning and Cragg, 111; and Ronald Spector, "How Do You Know If You're Winning?": 
Perception and Reality in America's Military Performance in Vietnam, 1965-1970" in The Vietnam War 
(fn.13), 156. 
22 Data from Harrison, 131. 
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3. Asymmetric Strategy 
The United States attempted a number of strategies during the Vietnam war. The 
initial strategy attempted was one on graduated pressure which primarily relied on aerial 
attacks against North Vietnamese targets. This was a cumulative strategy against an 
abstract center of gravity: "the aim of force was not to impose one's will on the enemy but 
to communicate with him."23 The goal of military action was to "convey American resolve 
and thereby convince an adversary to alter his behavior."24 This plan was rapidly proven 
ineffective because North Vietnam was willing to bear more costs than the U.S. was 
willing to inflict.25 This approach to the conflict which sought to minimize U.S. 
involvement instead created an open-ended American commitment to South Vietnam?6 
The failure of this strategy to produce rapid low cost results meant a return to a 
more traditional American strategy, a sequential campaign to destroy enemy forces. This 
strategy did not stand alone; cumulative aerial bombing and maritime campaigns to 
interdict the flow of supplies to the South and a cumulative population control campaigns to 
end the insurgency supported the sequential campaign?7 But the most visible strategy in 
Vietnam was General William Westmoreland's search-and-destroy operation conducted by 
23 H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 62. This strategy 
which conceived military capabilities as a communications and bargaining tool was primarily based on the 
theories of Thomas Schelling. See Schelling, Anns and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1966). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Robert Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 174-210, fully presents 
this argument. 
26 See McMaster, 298. 
27 The air campaign was comprised of Rolling Thunder and the later Commando Hunt operations. 
Naval interdiction operations were under the Market Time naval interdiction program and Operation Sealord. 
Population control campaigns included the small Marine Combined Action Platoon(CAP) program and the 
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support(CORDS) operation of which the Phoenix 
program was a major part. See Gilster, 18-21; and Summers, Atlas, 96, 100, 124, 148, 150. 
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large US units. Russell Weigley described this strategy as: 
aimed at denying the enemy freedom of movement not just in selected areas 
but throughout South Vietnam, at carrying the war to the enemy, and at 
winning victory by the means sanctioned by the most deeply rooted 
historical American conceptions of strategy, the destruction of the enemy's 
armed forces and of his ability to wage war.28 
It must be noted, however, that the strategic goal of Westmoreland's large unit sequential 
strategy was not the annihilation of the entire enemy army, but merely its attrition to a level 
where the enemy would quit the contest. Political considerations such as a ban on overt 
operations in North Vietnamese base areas in Laos and Cambodia and the goal of achieving 
a negotiated settlement prevented Westmoreland from fully adopting a strategy of 
annihilation. 29 
To drive the Americans out of the South, the North Vietnamese found it necessary 
to develop a strategy to fit the circumstances of the conflict instead of trying to fit the 
conflict to a strategy. To defeat the Americans, Giap based his strategy on the approach he 
used in fighting the earlier war against the French. He recognized that a sequential pattern 
to achieve victory was unlikely to work against a more powerful foe: 
We had to deal with an enemy much stronger than us. It was patent that 
this balance of forces took away from us the possibility of giving decisive 
battles from the opening of the hostilities and of checking the aggression 
from the first enemy landing on our soil. In a word, it was impossible to 
for us to win a quick victory. 30 
28 Russell Weigley, The American Way of War (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 464-5. 
29 American strategy is Vietnam is difficult to typify. At the operational level, it relied on a series 
of sequential battles and campaigns to destroy enemy forces, but only in South Vietnam. Because of 
politically-required geographical limitations, for war-winning results it hoped to exhaust the North 
Vietnamese war effort. The dominant American strategy for the war, whether it was sequential or 
cumulative, was, as we shall see later, still asymmetric when compared to North Vietnam's. For in-depth 
analysis of Westmoreland's attrition strategy, see Phillip Davidson, Vietnam at War (Novato, CA: Presidio, 
1988), 348-357. 
30 Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army, second edition (Hanoi: Foreign Languages 
. Publishing House, 1974), 54. 
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Instead, Giap would use a cumulative operational pattern. Individual battles and campaigns 
were not critical to the success of the conflict. As Stanley Kamow found, Giap and the 
North Vietnamese "viewed each engagement as a step in a series of encounters, winning 
some and losing some, until eventually the tide would tum in their favor."31 
Wedded to this cumulative pattern was an abstract center of gravity, the 
psychological will of the United States to continue the conflict. An American scholar found 
that: 
their emphasis was not on a military defeat of the United States but, 
rather, on exhausting the strategic possibilities open to it. The key was 
to defeat the 'aggressive will' of the United States- a psychological 
objective more than a military one. 32 
The North Vietnamese themselves were less explicit than in recognizing their emphasis on 
such an abstract center of gravity.33 As Giap said after the war, "For us, you know, there 
is no such thing as a single strategy. Ours is always a synthesis, simultaneously military, 
political, and diplomatic--which is why, quite clearly, the Tet Offensive had multiple 
objectives."34 Whether Giap had deliberately designated American will as the one critical 
center of gravity, it is clear that is where the North's actions had effect; Lieutenant General 
Phillip Davidson would later describe the war as "a war waged in a critical, but 
31 Karnow, 639. 
32 David Elliot, "Hanoi's Strategy in the Second Indochina War," in The Vietnam War(fn.13), 70. 
33 The [North] Vietnamese have been extremely reticent about releasing records of their wartime 
strategic thought. Most of the wartime and post-war writing by Giap and other military leaders was clearly 
for propaganda purposes. Even today, there has been little disclosure of internal information; during a 
1997 joint American-Vietnamese conference in Hanoi, no new documents were released from Hanoi's 
archives, strict media controls were placed on the proceedings, and General Giap refused to answer Robert 
McNamara's questions. See David Shipler, "Robert McNamara and the Ghosts of Vietnam," New York 
Times Magazine (August 10, 1997), 30. A fascinating question outside the reach of this thesis is "What 
measures of effectiveness did North Vietnam's military strategists use during the war?" 
34 Karnow, 535. 
65 
indeterminate manner, in the uncharted depths of the American psyche and in the obscurity 
of our national soul."35 
4. The Course of the War and its Outcome: 
From 1965 to 1968, the war was "a combination of insurgency and conventional 
war."36 The most significant early battles occurred in the Ia Drang Valley in November 
1965.37 One U.S. air cavalry battalion destroyed an NVA regiment, but another U.S. 
battalion was ambushed and badly mauled. Big unit operations continued in 1966. As 
Harry Summers recounts, claims of decisive results usually did not hold true; in one 
operation, "the 3rd NV A division was pronounced destroyed, but as was true of other 
'destroyed' enemy units throughout the war, it soon rose again from the dead."38 Over the 
next two years the Army would continue a series of large operations which had limited 
strategic effect on an enemy willing to absorb casualties. By 1967, the war was killing 800 
Americans a month for little tangible gain except the public pronouncements of success by 
both the political and military leadership. 39 
Late in 1967, the North Vietnamese launched a series of border campaigns to 
distract U.S. attention away from South Vietnamese urban areas. These diversionary 
attacks were followed by a general countrywide offensive on the lunar New Year holiday 
of 1968. The Tet Offensive lasted three months and resulted in mortal wounds to the Viet 
Cong military forces. The chief intelligence officer for MACV during this time discovered 
35 Davidson, 795. He also cites the claim that one objective of the North Vietnamese 1972 
offensive was to spur antiwar protests in the U.S. See 676. 
36 Ibid., 357. 
37 These battles are best recounted by two participants, Hal Moore and Joseph Galloway, We Were 
Soldiers Once ... and Young (New York: Random House, 1992). 
38 Summers, Atlas, 110. 
39 Statistics from Millett and Maslowski, 554. 
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that "the Viet Cong guerrillas and the VC political infrastructure, the insurgency operators, 
were virtually destroyed in the Tet Offensive."40 
While the effect on the North Vietnamese war effort was primarily physical, the 
damage to America was psychological. The massive offensive seemed to make a lie out of 
America's political and military pronouncements about progress in previous years. The 
credibility of the war effort with the American media seemed to evaporate. One of 
America's senior newscasters asked, "What the hell's going on here? I thought we were 
winning this war?"41 President Johnson had been dealt a mortal psychological blow; 
Karnow would later write, "his credibility- the key to a president's capacity to govern- was 
gone. "42 On March 31, 1968 he announced his decision not to run for a second term. 
Henry Kissinger later wrote that when the Nixon administration came to power in 1969, 
"our credibility abroad, the reliability of our commitments, and our domestic cohesion were 
alike jeopardized ... our country had been riven by protest and anguish."43 
Following the Tet offensive, the North Vietnamese reverted to small cumulative 
attacks and ambushes combined with infrequent "high point" offensive operations by larger 
units.44 During this period, Americans were being killed at a rate of200 a week.45 The 
North Vietnamese were maintaining the psychological pressure on America. 
At the same time, North Vietnam used negotiations as part of their psychological 
strategy. The apparent North Vietnamese acceptance oftalks or negotiations with America 
was used to gain American concessions such as a bombing halt. Yet, because North 
40 Davidson, 357. 
41 Walter Cronkite, as cited in Schulzinger(fn.2), 262; see also Kamow, 547-8. 
42 Karnow, 546. 
43 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 226. 
44 Davidson, 358. 
45 Data as cited from Kissinger, 235, for second half of 1968. 
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Vietnam had no real interest in a negotiated agreement, this process produced nothing but 
breathing space for the North.46 
Confronted with a turbulent domestic situation at home, President Richard Nixon 
introduced a new program to buy time to find a way out of the Vietnam quagmire. Nixon 
announced a program of American troop withdrawals and the process of "Vietnamization," 
turning the war effort exclusively over to the South Vietnamese. Instead of having the 
desired effect, however, this new program undermined any chance of mutual U.S. and 
North Vietnamese withdrawals from South Vietnam and did little to calm the harsh 
domestic situation. Hanoi viewed the program as a clear indication that America's will was 
broken; they continued to take every possible step to maintain the pressure and demand 
faster withdrawals.47 On August 15, 1969, America's mission changed from an 
"ambitious intention to 'defeat' the enemy and 'force' its withdrawal to North Vietnam" to a 
focus "on providing 'maximum assistance' to the South Vietnamese to strengthen their 
forces, supporting pacification efforts, and reducing the flow of supplies to the enemy."48 
The war would drag with direct American involvement for three more years. An 
American attempt to fight a sequential campaign in 1970 to cut off the North Vietnamese 
supply route through Cambodia was halted by increased domestic protests in the United 
States.49 By 1972, almost all US ground forces had been withdrawn. Sensing the 
opportunity for decisive victory, the North Vietnamese in March launched the Easter 
Offensive with a conventional army of new tanks and artillery.50 This offensive, which 
used almost every major unit in the NV A, presented great targets for Linebacker I, a U.S. 
46 See Kissinger, 259-61, for comments on the North Vietnamese negotiating style and strategies. 
47 Ibid., 275. 
48 Ibid., 276. 
49 Karnow, 609-612. 
50 One source claims that Giap was forced to execute this sequential campaign against his wishes 
by North Vietnam's higher leadership. See Cecil Currey, Victory at Any Cost (Washington: Brassey's, 
1997), 284. 
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air power campaign. The NVA suffered an estimated 100,000 casualties, lost 450 tanks, 
and was reduced to combat ineffectiveness for little gain. 5 1 
Following the failed offensive and the end of Linebacker I, the United States and 
North Vietnam reengaged in serious negotiations for a peace treaty. When the North 
Vietnamese backed out of negotiations in December 1972, Nixon ordered a second air 
campaign, Linebacker II. At the end of December, North Vietnam rejoined negotiations 
and the Paris Peace treaty was signed on January 27, 1973. 
Robert McNamara summarized the outcome of the war for the United States: 
By the time the United States finally left South Vietnam in 1973, we 
had lost over 58,000 men and women; our economy had been damaged by 
years of heavy and improperly financed war spending; and the political unity 
of our society had been shattered, not to be restored for decades. 52 
Although the North Vietnamese had suffered an estimated 900,000 killed, they would 
resume the offensive in late 1974 and take all of Vietnam in 1975.53 America's will to 
support its ally had been broken; Congress forbade any further involvement in Indochina. 
As Harry Summers saw it, "The sad truth was that the American people were sick and tired 
of Vietnam and just wanted it to go away."54 
B. HYPOTHESES APPLIED TO THE WAR 
1. Skilled Army 
The United States in 1965 had a skilled army. Political constraints, however, led 
the Johnson administration to take actions which undermined its effectiveness. These 
51 Davidson, 705. 
52 Robert McNamara and Brian Van De Mark, In Retrospect (New York: Random House, 1995), 
319. 
53 Estimate of NV A killed includes Viet Cong, from R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor Dupuy, The 
Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, 4th edition (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 1333. 
54 Summers, Atlas, 190. 
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actions included an unwillingness to call up experienced reserve forces, a reliance on the 
draft, and a one-year tour policy for soldiers in Vietnam. By the 1970s, these factors had 
gone uncorrected and, when combined along with national dissatisfaction, created serious 
problems in the armed forces. As William Colby noted, "the erosion of national will at 
home was being reflected in an erosion of discipline and morale among the remaining 
American troops in Vietnam."55 
Even the most skilled U.S. forces committed in 1965 were hampered by personnel 
policies which reduced their effectiveness. One air cavalry battalion commander from the 
early years who later would rise to three stars described his situation: 
We were being shipped off to war sadly understrength, and crippled by 
the loss of almost a hundred troopers in my battalion alone. The very 
men who would be most useful in combat- those who had trained the 
longest in the new techniques of helicopter warfare- were by this order 
taken away from us. It made no sense then; it makes no sense now.56 
These problems worsened as the war continued; the use of reluctant draftees and hastily 
trained junior officers put a "severe strain" on the military's "ability to carry out is combat 
missions."57 One military historian found that "the American military was fighting well 
below its potential as a result of several factors.''58 This Army's own statistics confirm this 
picture. The desertion rate more than quadrupled from 1965 to 1972, there were at least 
333 assaults with explosive devices against officers or sergeants in 1971, and at least 50% 
of the troops in Vietnam were using drugs of some sort in the same year. 59 
55 William Colby and James McCargar, Lost Victory (Chicago, Contemporary Books, 1989), 326. 
56 Moore and Galloway, 25. 
57 Stanton, 364. 
58 Ibid., 365. 
59 Statistics from Department of Defense as cited in Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage, Crisis in 
Command (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978). The author was also helped by Mark Lwin, "Modem Day 
Mutinies," an unpublished paper and briefing at George Washington University, 23 April1996. 
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The employment of U.S. forces was also hampered by the command structure in 
Vietnam. Unity of command was never achieved due to most significantly bureaucratic-
organizational pressures and a "business as usual" approach to the war.60 The United 
States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) had control only over American 
forces in South Vietnam. MACV had no authority over allied forces, nor did it direct air 
operations outside the South.61 This peculiar arrangement, which flew in the face of 
military wisdom about the unity of command, was a hindrance to the development of 
effective strategy. 
While America paid more attention to technology than skill, the North Vietnamese 
Army realized the importance of superior fighting proficiency. General Giap recognized 
that, "not only must we have great determination to fight and win, but we must also know 
how to fight and win, that is, we must have a good fighting method to be able to defeat the 
enemy."62 Accordingly, the North Vietnamese continued training their forces throughout 
the war. As one American source recounts, "even with a war going on all around them, the 
Viet Cong were still able to detach men from their units and send them to formal training 
courses."63 Once trained to a high level, these men were in the war for the duration, not 
just one year. 
The North Vietnamese adapted well to their material disadvantages. Giap himself 
realized the importance of such innovation by proclaiming "We must invent more methods 
of fighting the U.S. Air Force."64 With high level emphasis on adapting to superior 
American air and ground power, Giap and his forces found many methods to reduce their 
vulnerabilities and even the balance. North Vietnamese forces used elaborate camouflage, 
60 Davidson, 801-5. 
61 Summers, Atlas, 76. 
62 Vo Nguyen Giap, "Big Victory, Great Task" (New York: Praeger, 1968), 85. 
63 Lanning and Cragg, 63. 
64 Giap, Big Victory, 107. 
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close combat tactics, and landing zone watchers to protect themselves from American 
aircraft, artillery, and helicopters.65 One American general who fought against the North 
Vietnamese later said, 
Considering the state of technical competence of the society from which 
they came, they fought very well against a technologically superior society. 
They rapidly adopted tactics and techniques designed to diminish the effectiveness 
of their opponent's weaponry. 66 
Because their strategy was one of cumulative psychological gains to undermine 
America's will, the North Vietnamese Army did not have to win major battles for its 
strategy to succeed. Instead, the NV A only had to survive and continue to inflict American 
casualties. The NV A had enough skill to accomplish these tasks; Ronald Spector 
summarized their abilities: 
Although the Communists' skill and tenacity in defense inspired awe and 
respect, their performance on the offensive was often weak and ineffective ... 
A Defense Department study found that Communist-initiated attacks on U.S. 
positions, though they often achieved surprise, still cost the Communists 
an average of five soldiers for every U.S. casualty.67 
While the skill differential between the North Vietnamese and Americans was never as great 
as it had been between the Finns and the Russians, it was sufficient to allow Giap to 
execute his strategy. They had the skill they needed to avoid their own destruction and 
continue killing Americans. 
2. National Will 
America's will to conduct the war began to fracture in the early days. Public protest 
first came to Robert McNamara's attention on November 2, 1965. A Quaker set himself on 
65 For specific examples of North Vietnamese adaptation and innovation, see Currey, 251-59; 
Moore and Galloway, 230; John Plaster, SOG (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1997), 41-2, 80, 103; and 
Scales, 131-36. 
66 Lieutenant General William J. McCaffrey, USA(ret.), as cited in Lanning and Cragg, 209. 
67 Spector, 156. An excellent comparison of American and NV A tactical skill is also found in 
Griffith, 136-162. 
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fire in front of McNamara's Pentagon office.68 Despite this, McNamara reported that 
"from early 1966 through mid-1967, public support for the administration's Vietnam policy 
remained surprisingly strong, despite rising U.S. casualties and increasing media scrutiny 
of the war."69 But later in 1967, he was advising the President that "the American 
public ... does not give the appearance of having the will to persist."70 Henry Kissinger in 
1969 noted that the majority of public support was still behind the war, but perceived 
America as "a nation tearing at itself in the midst of a difficult war.'m The persistent and 
rising cry of anti-war protesters did not end the war, but it troubled decision makers and 
constrained the war effort. As one commentator found: 
While [the antiwar movement] did not succeed in transforming the goals 
of U.S. foreign policy in general, or the specific purposes of U.S. 
intervention in Vietnam, the mobilization of popular sentiment against the war 
did manage to block and/or reduce the scale of military strategies that were 
necessary to achieve those objectives.72 
This constraint on military operations was significant; the public's attitude prevented 
sustained offensive operations against critical targets in North Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
Laos. As a result, the United States could not find a military strategy to win the war and an 
unspoken goal of victory was dropped in finding an honorable way to withdraw. 
Unlike its neighbor to the South, the government of North Vietnam was 
characterized by "unity, tight control, and popularity.'m North Vietnamese morale was 
built "on the theme of nationhood for all ofVietnam."74 The North Vietnamese soldier(and 
68 McNamara, 216. 
69 Ibid., 252. 
70 Quotation from a memo from McNamara to President Johnson in early November 1967. See 
McNamara, 308. 
71 Kissinger, 292-3. 
72 Paul Joseph, "Direct and Indirect Effects of the Movement against the Vietnam War," in The 
Vietnam War (fn.13), 180. Schulzinger, 245, also has relevant comments on this issue. 
73 Schulzinger, 328. 
74 Lanning and Cragg, 198. 
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citizen) was given the simple message that "The war is going well, we are winning, but it 
will be a long time before final victory is achieved."75 With this popular and credible 
theme, along with strict internal security measures, no dissent arose in North Vietnam. 
Even after the death of Ho Chi Minh, when the younger leaders were supposedly war-
weary, there was no change in the goal of the war; the only debate was whether to risk all 
in a massive offensive that could quickly end the conflict, or continue to fight a more 
protracted war.76 
3. External Support 
The level of external support for North Vietnam far exceeded what Ethiopia and 
Finland had received during their asymmetric wars. Soviet and Chinese aid allowed North 
Vietnam to focus most of its manpower in the south, provided effective weapons and 
munitions with which to continue the struggle, and helped ease the effects of damage from 
American strikes. Perhaps most importantly, the specter of Chinese intervention served to 
limit American strategic options. 
The Soviet Union and China provided economic and material assistance which was 
many orders of magnitude greater than what Ethiopia or Finland had received. When the 
U.S. inflicted an estimated $85 million in damage by air attacks in 1965, the Soviets and 
Chinese provided aid valued at $250 to 400 million. 77 Soviet aid alone, from 1966 
onward, never averaged less than $400 million a year.78 The Chinese made every effort to 
meet Hanoi's requests in a timely manner; "Often, when Hanoi's requests exceeded 
75 Ibid., 173. 
76 On North Vietnamese war weariness, see Schulzinger, 274-5; on post-Ho strategy debates, see 
Currey, 283-4 
77 Schulzinger, 210. 
78 Based on data cited in Lanning and Cragg, 119. 
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China's production capability, Beijing transferred arms and equipment directly from the 
PLAto Hanoi's inventory.'m 
China also provided North Vietnam with around 320,000 troops from 1965 to 
1969.80 Although these soldiers did not engage in direct combat with Americans and were 
held in the North, they helped execute various engineering tasks, rebuild damaged 
transportation systems, man antiaircraft guns, and serve as a strategic reserve in the event 
of an American invasion of the North.81 The Chinese manpower allowed the North 
Vietnamese to commit its combatants to the South; as Douglas Pike found, "eventually 
almost all [NV A] infantry divisions were outside of North Vietnam-in Laos, in Cambodia, 
or, overwhelmingly, in South Vietnam."82 
Finally, the possibility of Chinese or Soviet intervention limited U.S. strategic 
options. In the early years of the war, an invasion ofNorth Vietnam was ruled out because 
of fears it might provoke a Chinese intervention similar to the Korean War. 83 By the time 
the danger of Chinese or Soviet intervention subsided following border disputes between 
the two Communist powers in 1969 and moves towards detente and diplomatic relations 
between each country and the United States, American will would not support any action 
which would expand the war. 
Soviet and Chinese aid did many things for North Vietnam. It provided a 
sophisticated defense system around the capital. It repaired infrastructure and replaced 
supplies lost to American air attacks. It allowed the North Vietnamese to shift their 
manpower from the defense of the North to the conquest of the South. And perhaps most 
79 Xiaoming Zhang, "The Vietnam War, 1964-1969: A Chinese Perspective," The Journal of 
Military History 60, no.4 (October 1996), 737. 
80 Schulzinger, 210. 
81 Zhang, 750-759. 
82 Pike, 48. 
83 McNamara, 211. It now appears that such fears were justified, at least before 1969; see Zhang, 
742, 746, 751. 
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importantly, it prevented the United States from attempting a possible war-winning strategy 
until America had lost the will to follow such a course of action. 
4. Opponent's Counter Strategy 
Did the United States realize the type of war it was fighting and take action to defeat 
the enemy strategy? The answer is clearly 'no' due to American misperceptions about the 
nature of the conflict and incorrect estimates of what could be achieved. The United States 
had to execute three major tasks in Vietnam: defeat the North Vietnamese, stabilize the 
South Vietnamese government, and end the insurgency. America achieved the last, 
partially succeeded on the second, but failed to accomplish the first. By 1971, the 
insurgent organization in South Vietnam had either perished in Tet or was destroyed by 
various pacification programs. 84 The South Vietnamese government was always shaky, 
but managed to hold elections in 1971 and field an army which continued fighting until the 
end. America, however, always misunderstood the type of conflict it was engaged in with 
North Vietnam. 
As H.R. McMaster asserts, "Johnson and McNamara succeeded in creating the 
illusion that the decisions to attack North Vietnam were alternatives to war rather than war 
itself."85 America's early strategy were based on two major assumptions: "first, that the 
principal difficulty in South Vietnam stemmed from North Vietnam's support for the Viet 
Cong; and second, that the gradual application of military and diplomatic pressures on the 
Hanoi government would persuade North Vietnam's leaders to terminate that support."86 
With a focus on achieving a negotiated settlement instead of winning a victory, American 
policy makers and military leaders attempted a variety of half measures which could not 
achieve decisive victory. The prospect or appearance of negotiations with the North 
84 Colby, esp. 420-21. Colby's claims were verified by Karnow who interviewed former Viet 
Cong and NV A leaders. See Karnow, 602. 
85 McMaster, 326. 
86 Ibid., 139. 
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Vietnamese came to be regarded as success. But as Henry Kissinger saw from a letter to 
Ho Chi Minh to Nixon in 1969, this was only a clever diplomatic strategy by the North to 
support their military campaign: 
It once again made clear that Hanoi would be satisfied only with victory. 
It counted on the nervous exhaustion of the United States; it would tolerate 
no appearance of 'progress' in negotiations that might enable us to rally 
public opinion. 87 
The perception of Vietnam in the early years of the war as an exercise in political 
communication between two states rather than as war meant that the U.S. not only failed to 
implement an appropriate counter strategy, but also made it easier for the North Vietnamese 
to accomplish their strategy. The attempt to present the war as a low-cost effort to convince 
North Vietnam to desist in its actions and American claims of progress after every large 
battle or move towards negotiations meant that North Vietnam did not have to win any 
battle or campaign militarily; Hanoi only had to prove America's leaders wrong, destroy 
their credibility, and break the nation's will to continue the fight. 
C. CONCLUSION 
North Vietnam adopted a fully asymmetric strategy in the war to end American 
involvement in Indochina from 1965 to 1973. The North Vietnamese were unable to match 
the technological systems which provided American forces with a superior level of 
firepower, mobility, and intelligence. Instead, General Giap and the North Vietnamese 
attacked America's national will by using a cumulative pattern of both small unit and large 
unit actions, none of which was meant to be critical in and of itself. 



























Figure 5. Strategic Options Matrix for U.S. and North Vietnam 
Giap's strategy forced America to reconsider its military aims and strategy in the 
conflict. In 1973, the United States would pull its all its forces in South Vietnam, cease its 
combat support of their army, and rely solely on a strategy of material aid and limited 
advisory support. North Vietnam achieved its goal; the United States would not attempt to 
interfere with its later efforts to invade the South and unify the country. 
The success of the North Vietnamese strategy is largely explained by the fact that 
the strength of all four of the contextual variables were in favor of their side. While North 
Vietnam did not achieve a skill differential of the magnitude that the Finns had against their 
opponents, it was enough to support their strategy. North Vietnamese national will 
demonstrated remarkable cohesion, even in the face of bombings and massive casualties; 
meanwhile America, absent any threat to its own land, was gripped by domestic turmoil. 
China and Russia provided massive quantities of men and material which, although they 
did not play a direct combat role, allowed North Vietnam to persist in the conflict and carry 
the fight into the South. Communist support also deterred American policymakers from 
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attempting an invasion of the North. Finally, America's strategy for dealing with the war 
was crippled by a number of assumptions which played into the hands of the North 
Vietnamese. During the war, Giap recognized importance of all four of these key variables: 
The victory of an armed struggle depends on many factors: the 
nature of the war, the comparison of forces in the two camps, the strength 
and quality of the armed forces, the fighting spirit of the armed forces and 
the people, economic and military potentials, strategic and tactical 
leadership, international assistance, and so forth. 88 
On the strength the those factors, he would achieve his victory. 





While America's technology will likely give it a decisive advantage against those 
who chose a symmetric strategy, the cases illustrate that strategic options exist for weak 
states despite their technological inferiority. As shown in Figure 6, the cases illustrate that 
there are a number of strategic options for weak states. As long as they avoid fighting great 
powers with strategies of the same quadrant, they may have a chance to win. 
We must remember, however, that Admiral Wylie's model only offers us an 
analytic tool to help categorize and identify enemy strategies. It does not make value 
judgments as to their effectiveness. Unlike the claims of some, the author does not believe 
that any single strategy is decisive in all situations. But by looking at similar situations, we 
can identify conditions which make strategies effective under common circumstances. 
Through the case studies, we have examined what conditions are necessary for the success 
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Figure 6. Strategic Options Matrix- Summary of Cases 
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The prospect of victory through strategic innovation by weak states appears to be 
dependent on a number of factors, all of which will rarely be in their favor and none of 
which is sufficient in itself. As Figure 7 shows, there is correlation between the skill 
differential, national will differential, level of external support, and opponent's counter 
strategy and the outcome of great power-weak state conflict. Additionally, as developed in 
the case studies, these factors more than correlate with outcome; they had direct causal 
effect. These factors are critical to the success or failure of a weak state's asymmetric 
strategy. 
Italo-Ethiopian Russo-Finnish American- N. Vietnam 
Skilled Weak State was less Weak State had Neutral or slightly in 
Army skilled significantly more skill favor of weak state 
Great Power had Equal- no dissent on Weak Power had 
National positive advantage either side positive advantage 
Will 
•Moral only •Moral •Significant Material& 
External •Some Material&Manpower Manpower 
SunnQrt • Possible external •Credible Threat of 
intervention external intervention 
Counter Italy took action to Russia underestimated U.S. misread enemy's 
Strategy preempt possible Finland's abilities and sponsor's aims and Ethiopian responses limited own effort 
No change to Great Great Power's war aims Great Power's war aims 
Outcome Power's war aims- reduced- Finland loses changed- U.S. ends 
Ethiopia occupied significant territory involvement in Vietnam 
Ftgure 7. Case Summary 
B. STRATEGY AND ASYMMETRIC STRATEGIES: RECENT EVIDENCE 
AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
Recently, asymmetric strategies have been the strategy of choice of states and 
pseudo-state actors born out of the absence or breakdown of states. Iraq attempted to use a 
sequential operational pattern to break America's will and the coalition's cohesion in the 
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1991 Gulf W ar. 1 In war of a smaller scale, Mohamed Farah Aideed went to war with 
America and the United Nations in 1993 and forced their withdrawal by using a cumulative 
strategy against the same center of gravity .2 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a 
largely autonomous Chechen state was created by the use of a cumulative strategy against 
the Russia's will. Finally, the Hezbollah, an externally supported non-state army, 
continues to wage a war of many small actions against the Israelis in southern Lebanon. 
In the future, it is clear that nations hostile to the United States will continue to use 
asymmetric strategies. A recent North Korean defector claims that, in the event of war, his 
nation plans to fight a cumulative campaign to break America's will; the North Koreans 
expect to rapidly cause up to 20,000 American casualties using massed artillery and 
missiles, some with NBC warheads. 3 The question is whether these technologically 
weaker nations will have the critical factors for success on their side. 
In terms of skilled armies, few if any nations will be able to match America's 
training resources. America's emphasis on defeating large armored invasions and using 
precision strikes, however, could mean that training resources may not go to the types of 
forces who will be the most likely to directly face asymmetric combatants. Furthermore, 
many of our opponents will come from "warrior" communities where fighting is a way of 
life. 4 Finally, the proliferation of WMD may be an effective substitute for the lack of a 
positive skill differential for a weak state; as a recent RAND report found, "any future 
adversary will most likely employ asymmetric strategies, prominent among which will be 
NBC weapons, especially chemical and biological ones."5 
1 See Lawerence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War," 
International Security 16, no.2 (Fall1991):15. 
2 See Rick Atkinson, "Firefight in Mogadishu," Washington Post, 30-31 January 1994. 
3 North Korean Colonel Joo-hwai Choi, as cited in the Washington Times, 26 September 1997, 5. 
4 Ralph Pete~s, "Winning Against Warriors," Strategic Review 24, no.3 (Summer 1996): 12-21. 
5 Gregory F. Treverton and Bruce W. Bennett, Integrating Counterproliferation into Defense 
Planning, RAND Defense Issues Report (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 1. 
83 
National will is probably the one area considered by ourselves and our enemies to 
be our greatest weakness. As Thomas Mahnken notes, "Americans have historically 
shown an aversion to becoming involved in protracted, bloody conflicts, except where the 
survival of the United States and its values is at stake."6 The evidence suggests that, in 
most cases, weak states may be able to count on a national will differential in their favor. A 
1997 public opinion poll found majority support in the United States for military 
intervention only in the case of a direct attack on America.7 This evidence, however, is 
highly speculative; actual responses in the event of a crisis are shaped by factors such as 
emotions and political leadership not considered by this poll. 
Finally, it appears weak states may have a harder time in gaining high levels of 
external support in the future. A quick look at the cases covered here suggests that weak 
states in a multipolar system may be ignored by great powers concerned primarily with 
relations with their rivals, but that weak states in a bipolar system may be able to secure 
ample support. Under this logic, weak states would probably have a difficult time gaining 
external support in a unipolar system dominated by America. This is a topic for further 
research. 
The prospects for the success of a weak state's asymmetric strategy based on the 
critical factors are uncertain in the future. Skill may be in their favor if America limits or 
misdirects its training resources or if WMD prove to be a viable option to balance the skill 
differential. National will appears to be in favor of America's opponents, but mass 
psychology is difficult to predict accurately in all situations. Finally, a quick look suggests 
that gaining external support may be more difficult now than in a world divided between 
6 Thomas Mahnken, "America's Next War," Washington Quarterly 16, no.3 (Summer 1993): 174. 
7 1997 Roper Starch Worldwide poll as cited in Army Times, 1 September 1997, 28. A military 
response to a direct attack on the U.S. had 84% support, while a response to attacks on Americans abroad 
had only 50% support, and intervention to protect economic interests had only 27% support. 
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East and West. The lesson for America is that while asymmetric strategies by weak states 
face uncertain prospects, so does our own military dominance based on this calculus. 
The final critical factor is our own counter strategy. Crafting an effective strategy to 
deal with hostile weak states requires two key actions: first, recognizing an asymmetric 
strategy; and, second, taking action to disrupt it and deprive the enemy of any advantage 
from the critical factors. Our effectiveness in developing such a strategy appears to be 
hindered by both our perceptions and our organization. 
In terms of perceptions, what we regard as a simple police action or a multilateral 
conflict-resolution effort, such as bringing a war criminal to justice, may be regarded as an 
act of war by the other side. Aideed saw our actions in this light; Radovan Karadzic might 
feel the same in the Bosnian Serb statelet. Our development of an effective counter strategy 
is hindered by asymmetric perceptions: their perception of war and our perception that it is 
something else. We need to see these conflicts for what they really are, and be prepared to 
take the necessary military actions to see them through. As one Army officer has observed, 
we need a "Revolution in Military Ethics."8 
Hand-in-hand with the correct perception of asymmetric strategies, we need an 
organizational structure that can develop and integrate all the necessary components into a 
military strategy. Italy in the first case and North Vietnam in the last were able to integrate 
military and non-military actions. But in America, as John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt 
have recently observed, "the military and diplomatic communities have yet to master real-
time, close-in cooperation ... and there is a growing need for such cooperation."9 To 
achieve this end, these two strategists see a need for a revolution in diplomatic affairs to 
accompany the revolution in military affairs. 
8 Ralph Peters, "A Revolution in Military Ethics?", Parameters 26, no.2 (Summer 1996): 102-8. 
9 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "Looking Ahead: Preparing for Information-Age Conflict," in 
In Athena's Camp (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 489-90. 
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A final application of this perspective on asymmetric strategy concerns America's 
potential role as a supporter of weak states faced by larger powers with advanced 
technology. U.S. direct intervention in their defense may not be always possible, whether 
it is because we view them as a peripheral concern, we have no formalized commitments to 
back them, or we have turned to an "off-shore balancing" grand strategy. The lessons of 
this thesis suggest that American support, combined with an asymmetric strategy by the 
weak state, may be enough to bring them victory. American Special Forces or private 
contractors could reinforce the weaker nation's skills. America could help in the 
development of psychological and information campaigns to strengthen the national will 
and weaken the enemy's. Finally, America could provide material support or even threaten 
intervention under certain conditions (e.g. the enemy's use ofWMD). Perhaps the biggest 
problem with this approach to support weaker states are the uncertainties associated with 
maintaining their own national will in the face of significant existing divisions; supporting 
a divided state like Ukraine (with a Russian and a native population) make be significantly 
more difficult than helping Taiwan, where, despite ethnic divisions, the populace is 
generally united in its attitude towards China. 
In conclusion, military strategy in war is properly viewed as a broad topic. The 
simple combination of a center of gravity and an operational pattern hold a vast number of 
possibilities for actual implementation. Furthermore, each one of the critical factors in a 
great power-weak state conflict involves a number of related topics. Maintaining a skilled 
army involves matters of force structure, training, innovation and morale. The need to 
sustain national will encompasses domestic politics and civil-military relations. Prospects 
for external support rely on foreign relations and the structure of the international system. 
The nature of strategy implies a need to escape a single variable approach to military 
problems (i.e. air power or precision strikes can solve it all). As Lieutenant General Paul 
K. Van Riper, USMC (ret.), recently wrote, "If as Colin Gray says, 'strategy relates to 
everything else,' then it is not possible to talk only of strategy in its largest sense. We must 
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think in a larger, more coherent manner."10 Strategists at the highest levels must be more 
than technical experts or advocates of one-dimensional solutions; as one scholar has 
written, "almost by definition, strategic thinkers are broadly educated, not narrowly 
trained."1 1 
10 Lt Gen Paul Van Riper, "Strategy and the Formulation of National Security Policy," presented 
at the National Defense University, October 1997. 
11 Gregory Foster, "Research, Writing, and the Mind of the Strategist," Joint Force Quarterly 
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